

**MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SIZEWELL A & B STAKEHOLDER GROUP (SSG)
HELD AT THE RIVERSIDE CENTRE, STRATFORD ST ANDREW
ON THURSDAY 5TH March 2015 AT 10.00**

PRESENT

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| Cllr M Fellowes | - Aldeburgh Town Council <i>SSG Chairman</i> |
| Mr M Taylor | - Suffolk Coastal Friends of the Earth <i>SSG Deputy Chairman</i> |
| Mr J Abbott | - representing Dr T Coffey (MP for Suffolk Coastal) |
| Cllr D Bailey | - Leiston-cum-Sizewell Town Council |
| Cllr R Bailey | - representing Cllr W H Howard (Leiston-cum-Sizewell Town Council) |
| Mr C Betson | - Leiston Business Association |
| Mr J Carey | - Sizewell A Representative |
| Ms J Girling | - Co-opted Member |
| Mr T Griffith-Jones | - Co-opted Member |
| Cllr T Hodgson | - Suffolk Association of Local Councils |
| Cllr M Jones | - Aldringham-cum-Thorpe & Knodishall Parish Council |
| Cllr S Robertson | - Westleton Parish Council |
| Cllr N Smith | - Middleton-cum-Fordley & Eastbridge and Theberton Parish Councils |
| Mr C Tucker | - Sizewell B Staff Representative |
| Mr P Wilkinson | - Co-opted Member |

IN ATTENDANCE

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| Dr C Barnes | - Suffolk Coastal District Council |
| Ms M Barnes | - EDF Energy Communications |
| Mr B Bridgewater | - Magnox |
| Mr M Cubitt | - Sizewell B Plant Manager |
| Dr L Franks | - SSG Clerk |
| Mr S Franks | - Sizewell A Plant Manager |
| Mr D Gregory | - Office for Nuclear Regulation outgoing Sizewell A Inspector |
| Mr P Hetherington | - SSG Secretariat |
| Mr A Jakeways | - Office for Nuclear Regulation incoming Sizewell A Inspector |
| Mr J Jenkin | - Nuclear Decommissioning Authority |
| Mr A Osman | - Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit |
| Mr S Parr | - Environment Agency Inspector for Sizewell B |
| Mr A Pynn | - Environment Agency Inspector for Sizewell A |
| Mr G Renn | - EDF Energy |
| Ms N Rousseau | - Sizewell B Community Liaison Officer |
| Sgt D Thompson | - Civil Nuclear Constabulary |
| Ms Angela Vincent | - Head of Comms, RSRL |

MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC

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| Mr C Barnett | - Shut Down Sizewell Campaign (SDSC) |
| Mr J Busby | |
| Mr D Green | - East Anglian Daily Times |

CHAIR'S OPENING COMMENTS

2553 Chair welcomed all attendees, provided domestic arrangements and asked all speakers to introduce themselves.

I PUBLIC FORUM

2554 Mr Barnett introduced himself as speaking on behalf of the Shut Down Sizewell Campaign (SDSC) and drew attention to the SDSC newsletter. He expressed his continued concern about the integrity of the Sizewell B Reactor Pressure Vessel, particularly as two Belgian reactors have been stood down by the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC), the Belgian nuclear regulator. He asserted that the root cause of the flaking was connected with ageing, corrosion and the ingress of water into the fabric of the vessel itself. He referred to an article published by the Nuclear Free Local Authorities Steering Committee (hard copies available at the meeting) and read out the FANC Director General's comments reported therein; "This may be a global problem for the entire nuclear industry. The solution is to implement worldwide, accurate inspections of all 430 nuclear power plants". He described the office of Nuclear Regulation as an 'office of nuclear rubber stamping' and their decision to grant another ten years of plant operation to Sizewell B, despite the RPV inspection still being some 18months away, as a disgraceful situation. He referred to the 10year extension of plant life at Dungeness with disgust.

2555 Chair suggested that Mr Barnett was asking the ONR to comment on the Nuclear Free Local Authorities Steering Committee article and Mr Barnett concurred. He reiterated his concerns and restated the quote from the Belgian nuclear regulator. Chair requested that Mr Gregory respond.

2556 Mr Gregory **agreed to request a formal written response from the ONR addressing the Nuclear Free Local Authorities Steering Committee article.** Mr Gregory added that the ONR were aware of the RPV materials testing results and, based on the information provided and the assessments undertaken, the ONR do not see a cause for concern. He advised that concern for the Belgian reactors does not translate directly to the UK reactors and reminded attendees that the Sizewell B RPV does have a safety case. Mr Barnett refuted the latter advising that he had been told by the ONR in writing that there was no safety case for the RPV and that the ONR rely upon the integrity of their inspections and tests during manufacture. Mr Gregory disputed this and Chair asked that **Mr Barnett take an action to provide a copy of ONR letter stating there was no safety case for the RPV and that they rely upon the integrity of their inspections and tests during manufacture.**

2557 Chair questioned whether FANC are the Belgian equivalent of the UK ONR and Mr Gregory confirmed this. Chair clarified that the ONR's counterpart in Belgium was highlighting that there could be an issue with all RPV's and asked that Mr Gregory clarify what the implications are for the rest of the nuclear industry. Mr Gregory advised that his counterpart had used the term 'maybe implications' and reiterated that the ONR were satisfied that there were not implications for the Sizewell B RPV. Mr Barnett suggested the only way to be certain was to undertake inspections of the RPV. Mr Gregory countered that this was not the only way to be certain as, if there is an understanding of why the Belgian reactors have this problem and a satisfaction that these causes do not exist in the UK, there can be certainty. Mr Barnett asked that the ONR respond to the article in writing and Mr Gregory agreed. Mr Barnett suggested running the Sizewell B reactor at half temperature and pressure to avert any danger. He demanded that the SSG support the SDSC and ask for a prompt response to these concerns. Chair reiterated the actions agreed (above in emboldened type) **adding that the article would also be circulated with the response.**

- 2558 Mr Barnett asserted that any Emergency Plan that emanates from the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF), an arm of Suffolk County Council, will be spurious and of no value because it will be untested. Mr Barnett said that the SSG have been asked to agree a leaflet to be sent out to all households within 15km of the sites to reassure the public that in the event of a disaster at Sizewell something can be done. He declared this leaflet to be false and untested. He suggested that this may contravene a code of practice for the County Council. Chair asked if Mr Barnett had a specific question regarding the Emergency Plan leaflet. Mr Barnett asked that the SSG 'wash their hands' of the leaflet and support the position of the SDSC.
- 2559 Chair commented that the SSG were pleased to be able to take part in the review of the leaflet, had previously agreed content for this which the leaflet had not been fully satisfied and had previously raised the question of practical evacuation. Andy Osman clarified that the SRF were not an arm of Suffolk County Council but a statutory partnership between emergency services, local health authorities, all Suffolk based local authorities and the environment agency. He explained that the final draft of the leaflet was in preparation and incorporating many of the changes suggested at the recent SSG sub group meeting, adding that this would be circulated to SSG members and the plans for subsequent issue shared. He invited questions.
- 2560 Chair asked that Mr Osman respond to Mr Barnett's comment about the plans being untested. Mr Osman reminded attendees that emergency plans are by law based upon a reasonable foreseeable accident; the risk identified by the operator and validated by the regulator. The regulator then provides Mr Osman with assumptions for planning for emergencies. The work undertaken has adopted a two tier approach; an inner tier that covers the risk for foreseeable accidents and a second tier reflecting the risk of more severe accidents and the learning from Fukushima that extends beyond legal requirements.
- 2561 Mr Barnett described the plans as totally inadequate. Mr Osman advised that the regulator has inspected the plans and Mr Barnett interrupted citing the HERCA WENRA agreement. Chair advised that this was an agenda item for later in the meeting.
- 2562 Mr Wilkinson disputed that the SSG were pleased to be involved in the review and that he supports the SDSC position. Chair reminded Mr Wilkinson that he had taken part in the review and that this enabled comments on the leaflet. Mr Wilkinson disputed this saying that the leaflet was not worthy of consideration because it did not include the SSG position derived 2 years earlier. Chair amended her statement to say that some of the SSG were pleased to be able to take part in the review.

2 APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE & DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

- 2563 Apologies for absence were received from Mr T Branton, Dr T Coffey (represented by Mr J Abbott), Mr J Crawford (represented by Mr M Cubitt), Ms P Hogan, Cllr W H Howard (represented by Cllr R Bailey), Mrs H Knights, Mr G Moorcroft, Cllr A Nunn, Cllr R Rainger, Cllr R Smith, Mr T Watkins (represented by Mr S Franks) and Mr D West.
- 2564 Chair advised that she was tracking attendance of members and contacting the organisations they represent. She expressed her dismay that Cllr Nunn and Cllr Smith were not present and had not arranged alternative representatives to attend.
- 2565 Cllr Jones advised that her husband works at Sizewell B. The updated list of Declarations of Interest from SSG members is attached as appendix 1.

3(a) MINUTES OF THE SSG MEETING HELD 04.12.15.

- 2566 The minutes of the SSG Meeting held on 4th December 2014 were agreed as an accurate record subject to the following agreed amendments:
- Mrs K Potts attended as an officer of Suffolk County Council and as such should be listed under 'In Attendance'.
 - Para 2415 amend 'SSG' to 'SSG sub group'
 - Para 2419 replace 'Emergency Planning' with 'paper'.
 - Para 2529 fourth sentence - insert 'is' between 'nature and' and 'built into the safety case'.
- 2567 Mr Wilkinson questioned why his specific question regarding the inventory of the dry fuel store was still not included on the action tracker. Chair apologised explaining that the action tracker circulated was not the current version and agreeing an **action to include this specific question on future versions of the Action Tracker.**
- 2568 Mr Griffiths-Jones referred to para 2458 advising that he was still awaiting a response from Dr Coffey regarding why she had voted against his co-option onto the SSG. At the request of the Chair, Mr Abbott (Dr Coffey's representative) explained he was unable to enlighten the meeting about this matter.
- 2569 Mr Abbott referred to para's 2483 and 2496 and advised that Dr Coffey has spoken to the NDA Chairman and Executive, understands the reasons for not voting, is concerned about increasing the number of co-options and would like the principle that the SSG should be representative of the community to be adopted. There have been a number of co-options of individuals associated with groups that combined together are not representative of the Sizewell local community; however, she does recognise that there are people opposed to nuclear power. Dr Coffey agrees that holding a sub group committee to consider the SSG Constitution with changes voted upon at the AGM is entirely appropriate, providing the core purpose reflects the views of the community and that reference to other stakeholder groups Constitutions would be valuable. Dr Coffey cautioned that considering changes to the SSG Constitution under any other business today would not be ideal.
- 2570 Chairman confirmed that she has obtained copies of the other stakeholder groups' Constitutions and that she had attended a meeting where the NDA guidance to stakeholder groups was discussed. Chair proposed to convene a sub group meeting to review the SSG Constitution with recommended changes for consideration by the SSG at their June AGM . Chairman invited comments from the community about the SSG Constitution. Chair emphasised the importance of ensuring community representation on the SSG to fulfil the primary remit of being a conduit of information between the industry and the community.
- 2571 Mr Wilkinson sought clarification of whether the SSG would be asked to vote on whether it should vote or not. Chair explained that the entire Constitution would be reviewed and that a majority view would sought. She advised that the SSG were not a decision making authority. Mr Wilkinson disputed that establishing a majority view was in effect a vote and said it was ludicrous to call it anything else.
- 2572 Ms Girling commented that the NDA guidance (previously circulated) had been closely adhered to when formulating the SSG Constitution. She asserted that the current Constitution was excellent, that the only issue arose from the consideration of co-option under any other business and that changing the Constitution to ensure future co-options were itemised on the agenda was the only significant change required. Ms Girling gave examples of how the SSG has functioned effectively previously. She expressed concern that the number of co-options could be reduced. Chair concurred and asked Mr Abbott to provide a copy of Dr Coffey's statement, recalling that this expressed concern should the number of co-opted SSG members be increased.

- 2573 Cllr N Smith asserted that if a large number of organisations represented one side of an argument that this gives a distorted view and that the SSG should be concerned to ensure that representative community groups should be co-opted rather than small specialised groups. Chair commented that the SSG were not overwhelmed with applications for co-option and that there was space for all interested individuals and groups. She reminded members that were elected representatives that they should represent the views of those that elected them and reiterated her dismay that the representatives of Suffolk Coastal District Council and Suffolk County Council were not present at this meeting. Chair said she appreciated that the membership of the SSG needed to remain 'workable'.
- 2574 Mr T Griffith-Jones reminded attendees that the SDSC was denied representation on the SSG about 2/3years ago. He advised that the Chair of the Hunterston stakeholder group had commented that any group wishing to join the Hunterston stakeholder group was welcomed if they had a contribution to make. He asserted that any group should be welcomed to join the SSG, that it was not a privilege that should only be bestowed upon a select few and that actually there was considerable work to undertake as a member of the SSG. He suggested that the present SSG has significant local authority members and should encourage a greater number of local community members. He asserted that it was inappropriate for the local MP to have a vote on the SSG when other MP's do not have this right. He asserted that the SSG was for local concerns and not the concerns of Westminster and that actually the MP's role should be to hear the concerns of the local community. Chair clarified that the local MP was allocated voting rights as the Sizewell sat within their constituency. She added that other SSG Constitutions do not allocate voting rights to MP's.
- 2575 Chair advised that members of the community do not need to be present at these meetings to have their views expressed but are able to approach any member to do this on their behalf. Chair asked for members to indicate their agreement to hold a sub group to consider their Constitution and the matter of voting rights and there was a consensus to do so.
- 2576 Cllr R Bailey sought clarification of the vote issue. Chair invited Mr Jenkin to explain. Mr Jenkin reminded attendees that this had been explained at the last SSG meeting (para 2483/4) and stated that that the NDA discourages voting on anything other than the election of the Chair/Vice Chair and changes to the Constitution. He stressed that this was guidance not dictate. Mr Jenkin advised that the review of guidance was prompted by receipt of a letter of complaint from Cllr R Smith regarding the process by which Mr Griffith-Jones was co-opted to the SSG membership. Mr Jenkin advised that SSG's are not decision making bodies but have a remit to allow a broad representation of views in the local community, to discuss issues relating to the operational decommissioning of sites within that community and to allow members to hear from industry regulators and challenge them accordingly. Therefore, it is not necessary for the SSG to always have an agreed position.
- 2577 Mr Wilkinson objected stating that the SSG are decision making and do decide whether they are in favour or against. Mr Jenkin reminded attendees that the position of the NDA has been in place since 2005. Cllr R Bailey described the NDA guidance as absurd and related the position of the SSG to that of Leiston Town Council stating that whilst neither were decision making they were asked to express a view and to do this they needed to vote. Several members began to speak and Chair interjected with an example of when a measure of the views of the membership was sought by the SRF regarding emergency planning. She explained that as Chair she needed a mechanism to understand the preferences of members to inform her actions on their behalf. Cllr R Bailey reiterated that the NDA guidance was absurd and asked for this to be changed
- 2578 Mr Jenkin confirmed that the NDA guidance was currently under review to enable improved clarity and usefulness for both SSG members and supporting secretariats. He reiterated that the guidance does not prevent members expressing views or for these to be recorded

and shared. The issue regarding voting arose because of the co-option complaint and this led to consideration of whether SSG members should vote on who should join their number.

- 2579 Cllr R Bailey interjected his view that the voting aspect of the guidance required consideration and amendment and again sought reassurance that this would happen. Mr Jenkin again confirmed that the guidance was being reviewed.
- 2580 Ms Girling described herself as a longstanding member of the SSG and the LCLC before that and reiterated that the current SSG Constitution, based on the current NDA guidelines, had been effective. She strongly disputed that the NDA guidelines deserved criticism, asserting that these were first class. She advised that the SSG Constitution received the approval of the NDA despite having voting within it. Ms Girling stated that the NDA guidelines were exactly that and not rules. She gave her view that the matter regarding co-option arose because of changes in the secretariat that meant the agenda did not state that a co-option was to be considered. Ms Girling again stated that the only change required to the current SSG Constitution was that any co-option should be itemised on the agenda.
- 2581 Chair concluded this discussion by reminding attendees that a separate meeting would be convened to discuss the SSG Constitution, that the SSG would liaise with the NDA and that recommendations for changes would be brought to the SSG AGM.
- 2582 Cllr D Bailey drew attention to para 2459 and thanked the secretariat for the vast improvement with circulating papers in a timely manner in advance of the meeting.
- 2583 Mr Abbott referred to para 2468 expressed Dr Coffey's comments that in summary suggested that if individual members of the SSG wanted a separate communication to be circulated to households, then they should fund the costs personally. Chair expressed concern that the MP was trying to 'clip the wings' of the SSG. Chair clarified that the legally required information from the operators has already been sent to households but that the leaflet from the SRF had not yet been finalised. Mr Wilkinson responded that if it was the will of the SSG to circulate their own leaflet then they had the funds to do so.
- 2584 Mr Gregory reminded attendees that it was a legal obligation under REPIIR for the operators to inform the public. He cautioned that other bodies wishing to send out information should ensure there are no inconsistencies that would cause confusion. Chair concurred and advised that any information from the SSG would be to assist the process.

3(b) MINUTES OF THE SSG SUB-GROUP MEETING HELD 29.01.15.

- 2585 Chair reminded attendees that this meeting had focussed on the SRF leaflet regarding emergency plans and invited comments about accuracy and matters arising.
- 2586 Ms Girling drew attention to para 6.1 regarding the Magnox website commenting that the SSG section was vastly improved. Ms Girling advised that the NDA had given assurance that their website redirected the user to the appropriate section of the Magnox website. Ms Girling expressed concern that the EDF Energy website described the SSG but only had a link to the Sizewell B community newsletter and not to the SSG information. Ms Girling requested that **EDF Energy include a link to the SSG section of the Magnox website** and this was agreed.
- 2587 Chair expressed concern that the SSG was not perceived as Magnox but retained independence. Ms Girling advised that she was planning to send an email to the NDA regarding ease of access to the SSG materials. Chair expressed her concerns about the new NDA website format but advised that this was gradually improving. Chair commented that updating the SSG section of the Magnox website required a request to a central source and could not be undertaken locally, expressing dismay that this process causes delay.

- 2588 Cllr N Smith advised that he had just accessed the NDA website and that the link to the SSG materials was not immediately obvious, suggesting that a link straight through was required.
- 2589 Mr Hetherington advised that there was an address that would take a user straight to the SSG information www.sizewellssg.org. Chair advised that members of the public would not know what exact words to use to find the SSG materials and that Ms Girling would be working with Mr Jenkin to achieve easy access to the SSG site.

4 MATTERS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES AND THE ACTION TRACKER

4i Emergency planning leaflet and update on HERCA/WENRA

- 2590 Chair advised that the emergency planning leaflet had been discussed already and invited further comments. None were forthcoming. Chair reminded attendees that the ONR had signed up to the HERCA/WENRA guidance but DECC was following UK legislation and directing ONR to follow UK and not the European guidance. Chair advised that the SSG had written to Dr Coffey to ask her to investigate the rationale behind this.
- 2591 Mr Gregory commented that DECC did not direct the ONR reminding attendees that the ONR are an enforcement agency and as such can only work within UK laws. He advised that the emergency plans in Suffolk went beyond the legal requirement to consider the area defined for reasonably foreseeable accidents. DECC, the lead Government department for legislating in this area, are considering the HERCA/WENRA recommendations in the context of the civil contingencies act and based on the safety directive. The ONR are advisors. He noted that REPPIR legislation was owned by the Health and Safety Executive.
- 2592 Chair expressed dismay that the ONR were not questioning why DECC were not considering the European guidance despite the ONR signing up to the HERCA/WENRA recommendations. Mr Gregory advised that the ONR have been influencing DECC to make improvements to offsite emergency planning and that locally the emergency plans extended beyond the requirements of the current legislation.
- 2593 Chair advised that the SRF are an excellent example of an organisation responding to public concern and going beyond what the current legislation requires. Chair stressed that the ONR should be advising DECC that the UK legislation is not as far reaching as that agreed within Europe and pushing for the UK legislation to be changed accordingly.
- 2594 Mr Taylor raised the issue of extendibility under REPPIR and questioned why DECC only has to implement the Directive by 6th February 2018. He expressed concern this delay commenting that local planning was not recognising the impact of complying with the HERCA/WENRA recommendations. Chair asked **Mr Taylor to formulate a question in writing to send to DECC.**
- 2595 Mr Wilkinson advised that the issue of how far the ONR are trying to influence policy was what the national forum between NGO's and ONR are addressing, citing an example taken from nuclear waste management and to what degree ONR try to influence policy with regards to for example what to do with plutonium.
- 2596 Mr Osman expressed dismay that Mr Barnett had left the meeting and said that he thought that SDSC had received a response from the DECC Minister on HERCA/WENRA that may clarify the DECC position. This would save the SSG from chasing this matter. Chair indicated that the SSG had received this communication.

2597 Mr Osman advised he was aware of a change of policy regarding extendibility that has been agreed by central government and agreed to take an **action to clarify this with central government and share this with the SSG.**

4ii Review of SSG Constitution and NDA guidance

2598 Chair advised that this had already been covered earlier in the meeting.

4iii Triennial review of Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM)

2599 Chair advised that the consultation document had already been circulated to members and that the consultation was closing 10.03.15. She encouraged consideration of this document and invited comments and questions.

2600 Mr Taylor asserted that this body and the assorted others should be disbanded and that a single body linked to the NDA should be created to consider and deliver what to do with legacy waste. This would enable all specialists to be under one banner to find a solution. He reminded attendees that the Government have put deep geological disposal and how to do bore holes into the national planning regime. Chair commented that the 3rd question asked of stakeholders in the consultation document was 'Do you think that CoRWM's functions remain valid?' and that Mr Taylor would respond 'no'. Chair questioned what the Nuclear Legacy Advisory Forum (NuLeAF) do? Mr Wilkinson advised that NuLEAF were an advocacy outfit.

2601 Ms Girling advised that the consultation refers to interim storage prior to disposal and expressed her ongoing concern about this, advising that there needs to be ongoing monitoring and challenge undertaken and that this should not be left to the SSG to implement.

4iv Any other matters arising from the Minutes / Action Tracker / Correspondence received.

2602 Chair invited comments, advising that the version of the Action Tracker circulated was not the most recent version and that she would **retrieve and circulate this**. Chair drew attention to the written response received from Mr Moorcroft, ONR, addressing the timeframe for review of the risk (*posed by Sizewell B*) given that work to build the dry fuel store had commenced.

2603 Mr Abbott commented that both of the actions assigned to Dr Coffey had now been completed and should be closed. Chair advised that whilst the action may have been taken that the topic remained open until the SSG were satisfied that this issue had been fully addressed. Mr Abbott asked that the comments reflected that the actions had been undertaken and this was agreed.

2604 Chair explained her rationale for not closing an action and re-opening a new action that addressed the same matter was that, by keeping a single action open for related topics, this enabled consideration of the actions taken in relation to the topic as these were described in the comments section of the action tracker.

2605 Mr Abbott sought and gained confirmation that the actions taken by Dr Coffey would be recorded in the action tracker and that Dr Coffey would be advised of any follow up.

2606 Mr Wilkinson reiterated that the question posed by him regarding the dry fuel store was quite complicated and did not appear on the action tracker. Chair reassured Mr Wilkinson that the exact wording would be found and included.

- 2607 Mr Osman asked if Mr Moorcroft's answer would be included in the action tracker and when Chair explained that a summary would be included that would link to the full response, Mr Osman asked, subject to permission from the ONR, to correct the written response by removing the words 'of the urgent countermeasure zone and' from the last paragraph. Chair agreed to check with Mr Moorcroft that this correction was appropriate. Mr Osman explained that the term 'urgent countermeasures zone' should not be used.
- 2608 Mr Osman referred to action 2108/2436/2418/2438/2481 regarding DEPZ determination and suggested that this should be closed and a new action regarding the HERCA/WENRA recommendations be added. He cautioned against morphing the original question asking how the DEPZ was determined into consideration of the HERCA/WENRA recommendations. Chair argued that as the recommendations impacted upon the size of DEPZ that they were related and should remain under the same action. **Chair agreed to ensure that the action tracker provided clarity as to the topic, answered and outstanding issues relating to the topic.**
- 2609 Mr Parr referred to action tracker items 2219/2324 and 2325 and questioned why all of these items were not closed. Chair explained that this was not the current version, that all of these items were now closed and that the current version of the action tracker, to be circulated, would reflect this.

The meeting paused for a short break at this point.

5. SIZEWELL B REPORT

- 2610 Martin Cubitt introduced himself as the Plant Manager at Sizewell B and drew attention to the written report dated March 2015. He provided a presentation that covered the following points:
- Safety: 1297 days since last EDF Energy lost time incident, 107days since last contractor lost time incident, 1563 days since last nuclear reportable event and 101 days since last environmental reportable event. Site safety remains at an excellent level.
 - Staff: 522 staff and 36 apprentices. 250 year round contracting partners.
 - EDF Energy UK Operation: EDF Energy power generated from one pressurised water reactor, 7 advanced gas-cooled reactors, 28 wind farms, 2 coal-fired stations, 2 gas storage sites and a gas station.
 - Periodic Safety Review: ONR has approved Sizewell B to continue operating for another 10years subject to ongoing normal assessments.
 - Twenty years of low carbon generation: Sizewell B had been generating electricity for 20 years on 14.02.15. Since commissioning to date the station has produced 172 TWh of electricity and saved 116million tonnes of carbon dioxide and equivalent greenhouse gases.
- 2611 Mr Wilkinson sought clarification of whether the figures quoted were across the fuel cycle and this was confirmed. Mr Cubitt advised that the figures accounted for items like the diesel for deliveries to site and the mining of uranium, summarising that this was a life time undertaking. Mr Wilkinson questioned what the carbon dioxide assumptions were for waste management, asserting that no account had been given to this. Mr Cubitt advised that there were assumptions about these included in the calculations. Mr Wilkinson asked what assumptions had been made and demanded facts and figures. Chair interjected that some members felt that there were other carbon implications to the full life cycle that had not been included. Mr Cubitt suggested that members consider the sustainability report to

understand where the data had come from and how the data was constructed. **Mr Cubitt agreed to circulate the sustainability report.**

- 2612 Chair questioned whether the figures for the amount of electricity were those generated or those that reached their point of use suggesting that there was up to 30% lost down power lines. Mr Cubitt advised the figures were for generation and that only a small loss (~2%) was incurred.
- 2613 Mr Wilkinson suggested that the quantity of spent fuel generated should also form part of the data so that the full picture was clear.
- 2614 Mr Cubitt resumed his presentation:
- Reactor Pressure Vessel: raised as a concern during the public forum. Meeting held 05.03.14. hosted by the ONR to discuss the Sizewell B RPV in depth. Next inspection to be undertaken early 2016.
- 2615 Mr Busby interjected that the RPV vessel head had been exchanged and Mr Cubitt advised that this had occurred in 2008 adding that this was a precautionary measure. Mr Wilkinson asked if this had been foreseen and Mr Cubitt confirmed that this was a planned exchange.
- 2616 Mr Cubitt resumed his presentation:
- Dry Fuel Store: concrete pour of base slab now 55% complete. Building steel work and cladding to commence shortly. Legacy National Grid transformer now removed.
- 2617 Mr Wilkinson asked what the carbon dioxide burden was for this. Mr Cubitt reiterated that this was included in the sustainability report.
- 2618 Mr Griffith-Jones disputed that this was not a dry fuel store but a dry nuclear waste store and questioned why it wasn't called this. A debate amongst attendees ensued about whether what was to be stored was fuel, spent fuel or waste. Chair interjected that the public need to be clear about what the nature of the stored fuel was and asserted that if the only destination for disposal was the GDF then it could not be described as just fuel but should have 'spent' or 'waste' as a descriptor. Mr Tucker advised that the fuel storage pond contains all fuel ever used at Sizewell B including that which will never be put back into the reactor. Inside there are fuel assemblies that do not change from being fuel assemblies irrespective of the number of times they have been in the reactor or stored in the pond. He added that current Government policy is to not re-process the fuel but that this may change in the future; that the fuel assemblies contain a lot of useable uranium and plutonium and that the high level fission products are not separated out that the fuel assembly remains intact and will be treated as such.
- 2619 Chair questioned why if the fuel assemblies had any residual value, the store would be in the form of a 'B+Q shed'. Mr Cubitt advised that the fuel assemblies would be entirely contained in 150tonne stainless steel flask with an overpressure of Helium. Mr Wilkinson asserted that the content of the flask had changed from being fuel to being spent fuel and that if the public believe it is waste then it should be called waste.
- 2620 Mr Parr reminded attendees that he was the EA regulator for Sizewell B, that the remit of the EA is to consider the disposal of waste, including radioactive waste, that the current Government policy is that spent fuel is not categorised as waste and, therefore, the EA have no jurisdiction over it. Mr Wilkinson forcefully asserted that spent fuel was waste and should be called waste. Chair asked if Mr Parr was comfortable with this definition and Mr Parr reiterated that this was current Government policy and asserted that this was spent fuel, was a potential resource that was fully retrievable and if Government policy changed then it could be re-processed. Therefore, this was spent fuel being stored. Chair suggested that, therefore, the store should be called a spent fuel store. Mr Cubitt added

that for clarity part of the commissioning process was to ensure that the fuel could be fully retrieved from the flask.

2621 Mr Cubitt resumed his presentation:

- Dry Fuel Store (cont'd): work continues on manufacture of the equipment and storage flasks and the hauling transporter (pictured in the presentation) is undergoing site commissioning.
- Dry Fuel Store Commissioning: explained with the use of a diagram and distinction clarified between inactive and active commissioning. Steps requiring regulatory approval were identified and an example of first concrete pour given as requiring approval before commencing.

2622 Mr Wilkinson asked what the time frame was for the commissioning process and Mr Cubitt advised that this had been provided in full previously adding that inactive system commissioning should be completed by the end of this year. Mr Cubitt clarified that the diagram was not to scale along a timeline. Chair interjected that **copies of the slides would be circulated to members.**

2623 Mr Taylor sought confirmation that there was an expectation that the fuel would be re-packaged and what the life span of the flasks would be. Mr Cubitt advised that this had been described previously and reminded attendees that the life span of the dry fuel store was potentially longer than that of Sizewell B and that if the site had been decommissioned, then a repackaging facility would be constructed to enable, for example, future transport regulations to be met.

2624 Mr Taylor asked for the lifespan of the flasks and Mr Cubitt advised that this was up to 100years. Mr Cubitt advised that the flasks were subject to the same 10 year periodic safety review as the site currently, meaning that continued use would be granted for the subsequent 10year period only if flask performance was as expected.

2625 Mr Wilkinson inferred that as the flask life was 100years beyond the time that the last fuel would be taken out of the reactor that the proposed storage was for 160years from today. Mr Cubitt confirmed that potentially the fuel could be stored for this time. Mr Wilkinson questioned the size of the store asking at what point it would be full. Mr Cubitt advised that the fuel store was sized for the 60year life of Sizewell B. Mr Wilkinson asserted that the fuel would have to be repackaged as the flask life span was 100years but that storage could be up to 160years. Mr Cubitt reminded attendees that whilst this was not necessarily the case, that after station decommissioning there would be repackaging facility.

2626 Ms Girling questioned how long the casks had been in existence and, therefore, how sure one could be of the integrity of the casks. Mr Cubitt advised about 20years currently and that the fuel contained within them had been removed and the integrity of the flask and fuel inspected. Ms Girling expressed concern if the integrity of a flask was found not to be satisfactory whether this would infer all flasks needed repackaging. Mr Cubitt reiterated that the 10 year periodic safety review would consider the integrity of the flasks and enable a 10year period to remediate any issues found. Mr Cubitt advised that until the site was decommissioned the fuel could be re-packaged using the existing facilities and that, thereafter, there would be repackaging facility specially constructed for this purpose.

2627 Mr Busby questioned whether any flasks had been built yet. Mr Cubitt advised that the flasks were being manufactured in the USA and that there was a link (noted as outside of the control of EDF Energy) at www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJ7g-ReOpVc that showed a Holtec flask being manufactured. These are not identical to those being manufactured for use at Sizewell B but the documentary does give a good indication of size, process for manufacture etc.

2628 Mr Busby asked if the dry fuel store was not ready by the end of 2016, whether the station would have to close and this was confirmed.

- 2629 Mr Cubitt resumed his presentation:
- Emergency Scheme off-site survey duties: Sizewell B has taken over responsibility from Sizewell A.
 - Staff & Community News: details provided of how staff raised £15,750 for Marie Curie charity. Pilot workshop with two local high schools to encourage more females into science and engineering.
- 2630 Cllr R Bailey asked whether the sustainability report, detailing how carbon dioxide consumption had been calculated for electricity generation, would be circulated prior to the next meeting and **Mr Cubitt took an action to ensure this**.
- 2631 Cllr R Bailey questioned whether he had understood correctly that the life of Sizewell B had been extended for 10years. Mr Cubitt clarified that he had NOT said this and explained that the 10 year period referred to the periodic safety review.
- 2632 Mr Griffith-Jones questioned how many of the current 36 apprentices came from the local area and Mrs Rousseau advised that all of them were recruited from within a 25mile radius of the station.
- 2633 Ms Girling commented that at the separate meeting about the reactor pressure vessel that it had been confirmed that there would be a full inspection of the vessel undertaken during the next Sizewell B outage. She questioned whether, when the regulators agree a further ten years of operation after a periodic safety review, this was subject to all ongoing inspections. Mr Cubitt confirmed that this was the case adding that if the next outage inspections raised an issue then this could affect ongoing operation. Ms Girling referred to the press coverage of the periodic safety review outcomes and suggested that a rider should have been included to explain that the next ten years of safe operation were subject to ongoing inspections.
- 2634 Chair commented that the slide describing the outcomes of the 10 year periodic review did not say that continued operation was subject to ongoing inspection and Clerk interjected that this had been stated by Mr Cubitt at the time of his presentation. Chair said that the slide implied that the station had the go ahead for the next ten years and that it should state that this was subject to ongoing inspections.
- 2635 Mr Gregory clarified the point of the safety case, explaining that when the ONR undertake the periodic review they consider the safety case and assess whether it is adequate for the next ten years. This means that ongoing operation must be within that safety case. The safety case includes in service inspections, maintenance, training etc and the operators must continue to undertake these and the ONR regulates to ensure that this happens.
- 2636 Mr Taylor asked what the agreed programme of work on the ONR list includes and asked whether it was correct to assume that all the work resulting from responding to the Japanese earthquake had now been completed. Mr Cubitt asked if this referred to the outcomes of the periodic safety review and Mr Taylor confirmed this. Mr Cubitt explained that approx 11 low priority items remained but that he would check and confirm. Mr Cubitt explained that the majority of the earthquake response work had been completed during the previous outage but that 2 items remained outstanding.
- 2637 Mr Taylor referred to his letter to Mrs Rousseau about drones and hydrogen embrittlement of bolts and confirmed that he had received a full and very satisfactory reply.

6. OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION (ONR) REPORT

2638 Chair advised that the ONR Sizewell B Inspector, Mr Moorcroft, had given apologies and asked if there were any questions arising from his report (dated 01.10.14. – 31.12.14.). None were forthcoming.

7. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY REPORT

2639 Mr Stuart Parr, Environment Agency Sizewell B Inspector, drew attention to the EA report and invited questions.

2640 Ms Girling referred to the burn-up of fuel and quoted the section of the report regarding best available techniques should EDF energy choose to increase the burn-up of fuel in the reactor. She referred to previous questions about the use of MOX and high-burn up fuel. Ms Girling cited the EA statement “Our assessment concluded that there are good sustainability arguments for increasing fuel burn-up and that discharges would remain within current permitted limits” advising that there would be implications for the fuel pond as high burn-up fuel has to be left in the ponds for an extended period of time. Mr Parr advised that the safety of the ponds is not within the EA remit but regulated by the ONR.

2641 Mr Tucker advised that there had been a safety case made to slightly increase the peak pellet burn up and that this was not a change to the use of high burn-up fuel or MOX. The one consequence of this was that the fuel was made slightly more reactive so after refuelling the cycle has to be started with a slightly higher level of dissolved Boron in the primary circuit which itself raises the level of tritium slightly. This has been mitigated by removing components from the core that significantly reduces the amount of tritium produced in the cycle.

2642 Chair confirmed that this was Mr Parr’s understanding and Mr Parr advised that the statement was to increase the fuel burn-up and NOT to use high burn-up fuel.

2643 It was **agreed that the minute recording Mr Tuckers comments would be checked by Mr Tucker for accuracy prior to circulation.**

2644 Mr Griffith-Jones questioned why the term ‘fuel’ was used to describe the end product that was taken out of the reactor and what the process was that would utilise the increase in burn-up and why this was of benefit. Mr Tucker advised that a fresh fuel assembly would undergo two or three 18month cycles in the reactor. The power that it runs at in the reactor determines whether that assembly undergoes two or three cycles and it is the position of the assembly in the reactor that determines the power. The small increase in burn-up levels will mean that more of the assemblies will be able to spend three cycles in the reactor. He explained the slight changes to fission product generation and concluded that after several years there would hardly be a discernible difference. He advised that the process was limited by the fission products absorbing neutrons and in effect turning the reactor off. Another limiting factor is the fuel assembly cladding material which over time becomes oxidised and there needs to be absolute assurance that even at the end of a fuel assembly’s life that the cladding will remain integral and contain the fuel safely. Mr Tucker concluded that the experience of other PWR reactor generators was used to inform decisions taken at Sizewell B.

2645 Mr Taylor asked about tritium levels and why they were occasionally exceeding quarterly notification levels. Mr Parr clarified that the regulatory process specifies limits for discharges and operators are not allowed to exceed these limits. The EA also specify notification levels to indicate how the plant is performing within each quarter and these act as an early indicator of plant performance enabling intervention before any limit is reached. He stressed the difference between ‘limit’ and ‘level’.

- 2646 Mr Wilkinson asked what criteria were used to set the limits and levels. Mr Parr advised that the EA publish limit-setting guidance and he offered to send this to the SSG or clarify the guidance at the next meeting. Mr Wilkinson asked if the guidance was informed by PHE criteria and questioned whether the EA were aware that there was a great deal of uncertainty about the health impact of exposure to radioactivity. Mr Parr advised that the EA were aware that there were differing views about the dose response model. Mr Wilkinson asked whether the limits were set taking into account the differing views and Mr Parr advised that the EA use the best scientific advice available. Mr Wilkinson stressed that there was a range and that concerns on the pessimistic side were gathering credence. He asked if the EA considered the European Commission on Radiation Research concerns and suggested that Public Health England were not a 'font of wisdom'. He stressed that there was a disconnect between dose and risk and asserted that the assumption that 'if a dose is low enough it doesn't have an impact', has been discredited. **Mr Parr agreed to take this question and provide a written response.**
- 2647 Mr Griffith-Jones referred to the environmental monitoring section of the report and questioned whether the work of Tim Deere-Jones had been considered as this suggested that the current sampling was ineffective. Mr Parr advised that it was the Tim Deere-Jones paper that had instigated the review of environmental monitoring and had contributed to a change to the guidance.
- 2648 Mr Griffith-Jones asked what the 'Sizewell habits survey' included. Mr Parr advised that this was part of the environmental monitoring programme to establish who was eating the local vegetables, who the most exposed individuals in the local area were, to calculate what the potential doses to those individuals are. Mr Parr clarified that this was total dose as the sources could not be differentiated. Wilkinson asserted that it was the possible impact of these doses that was of interest and that this should be established before any more discharges were authorised.
- 2649 Mr Taylor asked about the very low level waste that the EA has authorised to go to landfill, suggesting that much of this actually goes to Great Blakenham to be incinerated. He questioned what controls were in place. Mr Parr advised that VLLW from Sizewell B was incinerated in Southampton. Mr Taylor sought reassurance that VLLW was not being disposed of in landfill and Mr Parr advised that Sizewell B do not use the authorised landfill site and that solid radioactive waste was disposed of via the incinerator or sent to the LLW repository, DRIGG.
- 2650 Mr Parr referred to the two questions posed to the EA resulting from the debate about steam venting; record keeping, environmental monitoring. Mr Parr summarised the EA responses as follows:
- *Record keeping:* Operators have a legal requirement to create records of any radioactive waste disposal into the environment. Recent investigations into this have shown that records have been kept but could be improved upon. All discharges are reported to the EA and are made available on the public register.
 - *Environmental Monitoring:* distinction between normal operations and accident situations. For the former there is substantial monitoring undertaken by both the EA and the operators themselves. All outcomes are on the public register. For the latter, the prevention of accidents is the responsibility of the ONR and the EA is a category 1 responder for an off-site release. The response would be, in conjunction with the Food Standards Agency, to undertake a bespoke and specific environmental monitoring programme.
- 2651 Mr Busby advised that the issue of steam venting had been debated since his site visit in Dec 2012. He commented that whilst content that records were being kept that the scope and accuracy of information was essential to follow up the consequences of any steam venting event. He said that the date, time, duration, an estimate of steam quantity and the prevailing wind direction were all essential factors to enable this.

- 2652 Mr Busby re-iterated his concern about the possibility of a leak between the primary and secondary circuit (see para 2373/2374 Mins of 11.09.14.). He advised that under normal circumstances there would be minimal tritium levels in the steam but if leakage had occurred then the tritium levels could escalate. He advised that there were over 20,000 tubes each with a wall thickness of 1.2mm. He asserted that if monitoring after steam venting was undertaken that this would provide assurance that there had been no leaks.
- 2653 **Chair suggested that Mr Parr responded in writing and Mr Parr agreed to this.**
- 2654 Mr Tucker said he understood the desire for monitoring and advised the following:
- 70 atmospheres pressure differential across the tubing enabling immediate detection of any leaks.
 - Steam generator blow down (a continuous flow of sampling water from the steam generators) goes through radiation monitors.
 - Continuous radiation monitors on all four main steam lines and gaseous detectors on the condensers to detect any radioactivity.
 - Any leakage would be concentrated in the steam generators and only a small fraction would come out in the steam
- Mr Tucker concluded that the best monitoring was not to undertake sampling in the environment but to continuously monitor the water and steam in the system. Chair asked for this response in writing.
- 2655 Mr Busby suggested that to check the environment would provide assurance for internal monitoring.
- 2656 Mr Parr re-iterated that if there was a leak between the primary and secondary circuit then there would be a bespoke environmental monitoring that would consider the wind direction. Mr Busby asked for this to be undertaken routinely.
- 2657 Mr Wilkinson led a vote of thanks to Mr Busby for pursuing this debate for the last two years.
- 2658 Mr Wilkinson asked the EA to agree to undertake a limited period of monitoring, as suggested by Mr Busby, after steam venting that was specific to the area underneath the plume to provide assurance that current operator monitoring was adequate. He asserted this would assuage the public concern. Mr Parr questioned whether this was to be undertaken during routine operations or in the event of an accident, Mr Wilkinson advised this was during routine operations and Mr Parr replied the short answer was no and reiterated the current monitoring arrangements. He asserted that the levels of tritium in the steam were so low that once diluted and dispersed into the environment this would be undetectable. Mr Wilkinson challenged the EA to prove this and Mr Parr advised that he could provide the limits of detection for the monitoring equipment, could provide the naturally occurring levels of tritium in the environment and an indication of the levels of tritium deposition occurring under a routine secondary steam leak. Mr Wilkinson argued that this was theory and that a monitoring programme would provide the reassurance being sought. Mr Parr argued that the current environmental monitoring programmes were adequate. Chair suggested that the request for monitoring should be put into writing and suggested that the EA could consider this when undertaking random sampling.
- 2659 Mr Busby advised that the half life of tritium was short, only 12.3 years, meaning that it was very reactive and decayed quickly. He asserted that detection should be undertaken immediately after release. Mr Parr countered that 12.3 years was a long half life and enabled 12 years before the quantity had halved in activity. He added that tritium was a weak β emitter, not very energetic in radioactive terms and therefore was difficult to detect in the environment. Mr Busby advised that in droplet form tritium was 25,000 times more potent than in gaseous form. Chair interjected that if tritium was difficult to find then random sampling should be undertaken as the EA could not confirm that tritium was not present.

Mr Parr advised that it was difficult to find because it was not very radioactive. Mr Wilkinson reiterated Mr Busby's comment about potency and Mr Tucker clarified that this was NOT an increase in radioactivity in different forms but rather an increase in estimated biological impact and hence a radiation detector would not be able to find this. Mr Wilkinson angrily responded and Chair intervened and called the debate to a close.

2660 Cllr R Bailey said he would like to second the vote of thanks to Mr Busby. Chair concluded that it had been helpful for Mr Busby to raise awareness of this matter. Chair thanked industry for their patience with fully answering the concerns raised.

2661 **Mr Busby asked that his written response was included as an appendix to these minutes and Chair agreed to do this** (appendix 2).

8. SIZEWELL A REPORT

2662 Mr Franks introduced himself as the Sizewell Plant Manager and drew attention to the written response (responding to para 2503, Mins of 04.12.14.) provided in hard copy at this meeting regarding low level waste destinations. Chair commented that she was surprised that waste was shipped out of the UK.

2663 Mr Franks advised that the presentation would be about the Magnox waste strategy and delivered by Ben Bridgewater. He drew attention to the written report dated March 2015, previously circulated, and verbally reported the following points:

- Compliance: tighter controls to prevent a recurrence of the presence of lightly contaminated liquid in the drained heat exchangers have been implemented.
- People: decommissioning structure implemented from Monday 2nd March.

2664 Mr Taylor asked about the loss of 80 people, questioned how many of these were now unemployed and how the site would manage with this reduced workforce. Mr Franks advised that the plant previously had a staffing structure that serviced the emergency scheme arrangements for a fuelled site and that since defuelling these arrangements had changed and correspondingly so had the staffing structure. He advised that all staff had left on voluntary selective severance and that they had either retired or found alternative work.

2665 Cllr R Bailey asked what fuel element debris was and Mr Franks explained that this was made up of the spiders, springs and lugs removed from the fuel containers to enable increased packing efficiency of fuel for dispatch.

2666 Chair confirmed that Mr Franks would stay to answer any further questions after the presentation.

Magnox Waste Strategy Update

2667 Mr Ben Bridgewater introduced himself as part of the Magnox Waste Strategy team and advised that he would provide an update on the 'direction of travel' of the waste management strategy including details of the impact on Sizewell A. He opened the presentation by thanking the SSG for their patience and reminding them that the process for determining the Magnox waste strategy had begun in 2013 with the initial engagement workshops. The following key points were noted:

- Strategy has evolved from that proposed by the NDA as the preferred option, to include input from the new Parent Body Organisation.
- Safety, security and the environment remain the key priorities
- Waste strategy challenged to provide best value to the UK tax payer
- Review of the following aspects in particular:

- Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) packaging and storage
- Fuel Element Debris (FED) management
- ILW pond skips
- IONSIV Cartridges
- Principles applied include:
 - Deployment of most appropriate packaging
 - Best use of regionally available assets
 - Where possible, share assets with adjacent EDF energy sites
 - Develop new waste route for low level waste (LLW) FED
- Implications for Sizewell A include:
 - Continue to use Ductile Cast Iron Containers (DCIC's)
 - No dissolution of FED
 - Explore potential new waste route for LLW FED to go to LLW repository

2668 Mr Wilkinson suggested that a cynic would think that Magnox had simply changed the categorisation of FED from ILW to LLW and questioned what percentage of Sizewell A FED would fall into the LLW category. Mr Bridgewater advised that circa 95% was likely to be LLW and that an estimated two mosaic packages of FED ILW would be generated. Mr Wilkinson questioned how this could be true given that previously all FED was considered ILW. Mr Bridgewater explained that learning from Bradwell had enabled a better understanding of what was likely to be found at Sizewell A and, whilst not definitive, this was very positive. Mr Wilkinson stressed the importance of understanding the impact before describing disposal as 'safe', giving an example of Bradwell FED dissolution.

2669 Mr Bridgewater resumed his presentation:

- Implications for interim ILW storage are that no store would be built at Sizewell A, a smaller number of packages will be generated by Bradwell, Dungeness and Sizewell and that the existing Bradwell ILW store has capacity to store all of these. Estimates are that Sizewell will produce a total of 12 packages to be stored at Bradwell.

2670 Chair commented that not all of the SSG members were still present, that a copy of the presentation would be circulated afterwards and that the SSG may request that Mr Bridgewater return on another occasion. Mr Bridgewater advised that there were hard copies of a leaflet available at this meeting called "The Impact of the proposed waste strategy at Sizewell A Site".

2671 Mr Bridgewater resumed his presentation:

- Implications for interim ILW storage (cont'd) are that contingency plans for ILW storage were to be discussed with EDF Energy at a corporate level.

2672 Chair asked if this meant that there would be an ILW store at Sizewell B and heard that these discussions were at a corporate level currently and that this was only contingency if the number of ILW packages exceeded the capacity of the Bradwell store.

2673 Mr Bridgewater resumed his presentation:

- IONSIV cartridges:
 - Previously used to remove radionuclides from the pond water at Oldbury, Dungeness and Sizewell.
 - Proposal to consolidate to single site (Oldbury) for packaging underwater to enable ponds at Dungeness and Sizewell to be drained and decommissioned.

2674 Ms Girling questioned how the eight IONSIV cartridges were to be transported if they were not going to be packaged on site. Mr Bridgewater explained that the IONSIV cartridges currently sit in a fuel skip and that the same flasks previously used to transport fuel would be used to transport the cartridges via rail to Oldbury.

- 2675 Ms Girling requested that the SSG consider holding a sub group meeting to consider the movement of legacy waste and the CoRWM review. She stressed the importance of managing legacy waste as sensitively as possible.
- 2676 Mr Bridgewater resumed his presentation:
- ILW pond skips - approx 60 ILW pond skips to be transferred to a central decontamination facility to enable about 75% to be recycled as metal waste and 25% to be stored as ILW. Location of central facility not yet decided but unlikely to be Sizewell A, due to spacial constraints.
- 2677 Chair asked if there would be public consultation on this strategy and how Magnox was engaging with the local authorities and other local councils. Mr Bridgewater explained that the proposals require internal approval from the Magnox executive and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) prior to permissioning with the regulators. Thereafter, there would be further engagement with stakeholders and Local Authority planners. Chair expressed concern that the 2013 workshops were not full public consultations and that the SSG were clear that, although they could provide a view, this was not that of the public. Mr Bridgewater explained that Magnox and NDA had been proactive in hosting local public events in Saxmundham and Leiston. Chair stressed that the information had changed and that the public should be consulted with.
- 2678 Ms Girling reiterated the importance of enabling a sub group to consider the proposed strategy further with the information provided today.
- 2679 Mr Taylor advised his understanding that the railhead was redundant now that the fuel had been removed. Mr Bridgewater advised that Direct Rail Services manage the railhead and would be engaged for the transport proposed and that the transportation plans had yet to be finalised.
- 2680 Chair stopped the presentation at this point advising that the quantity of information to be relayed had been underestimated and that the meeting did need to allow time for the Sizewell A regulators' reports. She thanked Mr Bridgewater for his attendance and suggested that the SSG would invite him to return to address the SSG at a future meeting.

9. OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION (ONR) REPORT

- 2681 Mr Daniel Gregory, ONR Sizewell A Site Inspector, advised that this would be his last SSG meeting as he was being replaced by Mr Andrew Jakeways, the incoming Sizewell A Inspector. He drew attention to his written report (dated 01.10.14. – 31.12.14.) and provided a verbal report of his work this quarter which was noted to include the following:
- two inspections found satisfactory; asbestos treatment plant; waste storage and processing facilities)
 - consideration of the transition processes, including training, management of change and the emergency arrangements, that resulted in issuing of the licence instrument to approve the emergency plan.
- 2682 Questions were invited and none were forthcoming. The Chair thanked Mr Gregory for his contribution to SSG meetings and welcomed Mr Jakeways as the incoming Sizewell A ONR Inspector.

10. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY REPORT (EA)

- 2683 Mr Andy Pynn, Environment Agency Sizewell A Inspector drew attention to the written report dated March 2015 and drew attention to the outcomes of the incident involving the heat exchangers, detailed in the Sizewell A report, that involved the issue of a warning letter. He invited comments and questions.

- 2684 Chair questioned whether this incident had resulted in any learning across the fleet and heard that the report and investigation undertaken by the site was in depth and did identify a root cause. He was unable to comment whether the site had shared this with other sites. Mr Pynn added that he would be looking to ensure that similar mistakes were not repeated. Chair commented that the decommissioning process would mean that lots of pieces of plant would be leaving site and this was confirmed. Mr Gregory added that the ONR also investigated this matter under LC54 and the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Act and that the ONR were satisfied that the site have now made changes that would prevent reoccurrence. Mr Franks added that this had been communicated within the fleet as a site brief.
- 2685 Mr Taylor questioned whether the sewage outfall, via the cooling water system, was still monitored. Mr Pynn advised that this was an authorised discharge route and was still monitored for compliance against limits.
- 2686 Ms Girling sought clarification that this outfall was the sewage outlet for both Sizewell A and Sizewell B and questioned how frequently this was monitored. **Mr Pynn agreed to take an action to check these details.**

11. NUCLEAR DECOMMISSIONING AUTHORITY REPORT

- 2687 Chair advised that the NDA monthly updates had been circulated to members and Mr Jonathan Jenkin invited questions.
- 2688 Chair asked for comment on the recent press article in the Independent that made two key points: six of twelve Magnox and RSRL sites are behind schedule; need for additional funding. Mr Jenkin advised that a response to this has been published on the NDA website. He summarised this response explaining that Cavendish Fluor Partnership had been asked to revise their plan according to current status of the fleet by undertaking a 12 month consolidation review. The new performance plan was anticipated later this year. He emphasised that in terms of funding the costs savings may not be as large as originally thought but would still be substantial compared with the original baseline plan for Magnox and RSRL. Chair commented that the costs associated with running the competition and the legal challenge from the previous PBO may negate any savings and Mr Jenkin reiterated that until the new plan was available the extent of any changes to costs were not known. **Chair agreed an action to circulate the article and the NDA response to all members.**

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/babcock-to-demand-more-state-money-for-nuclear-cleanup-10076954.html?origin=internalSearch>

<http://www.nda.gov.uk/2015/02/site-licence-companies-to-merge/>

- 2689 Chair sought confirmation that the NDA have received her request for information about the meeting held between the NDA and Therese Coffey. Mr Jenkin clarified that the NDA Chairman and Executive have an annual informal dinner with those MP's who have constituencies that contain decommissioning sites to discuss any concerns. He confirmed that he had not attended the dinner.

12. CHAIR'S REPORT

- 2690 Chair verbally reported the following actions:
- Visited Jim Crawford, Station Manager at Sizewell B Site, as he was unable to attend the SSG meeting or previous meetings himself.
 - Attended NDA meeting held in February to discuss the NDA guidance for stakeholder groups and socio-economic funding.

2691 Mr Taylor questioned whether the NDA meeting had considered new build and Chair advised that new build have adopted a model of having an independent forum during the construction phase but that once it had become an operating licence site may revert back to the stakeholder group. Mr Jenkin added that as the NDA sites close that there would need to be discussion with EDF Energy regarding stakeholder group engagement. Chair stated that there was no equivalent of the NDA for new build. Ms Girling stressed the importance of having a group to act as conduit of information for the local community. Mr Taylor added that the government have given the impression that stakeholder groups have a role in discussing new build and that this had not been fully discussed. Chair suggested formulating a question about the role of the NDA and of DECC and the ongoing role of the SSG in the light of new build. Ms Girling suggested that the NDA may have a view on this too and would be able to share their experience.

13. ANY OTHER BUSINESS

2692 Chair advised that no other business or correspondence had been received in writing.

2693 Ms Girling asked for an update on how the money allocated to the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) has been spent. Chair advised that Mr Crawford has convened a meeting later in March to consider the allocation of funds to the AONB.

2694 Ms Girling asked that her request for an update about Sellafield posed at the December SSG meeting was included on the Action Tracker. Chair agreed to ensure this was included.

2695 Cllr Jones reminded Chair that it had been previously agreed to allow presenters to give their full presentation and then ask questions afterwards commenting that this had not happened at this meeting and that presentations had been continually interrupted. Chair commented that she encouraged all attendees to speak, that occasionally it assisted a speaker to know where the interest of the audience lay and that all speakers are empowered to ask that questions are held back until the presentation has been given. Chair reminded members that she intervenes if she feels that members are being disrespectful and to move speakers on as appropriate. Chair stated that it was not in the SSG Constitution and that she would not insist that questions are only asked at the end of a presentation. She advised that use of the asterisk on the agenda was to indicate when the public would be able to ask questions and did not mean that the presentation had to be fully heard before any questions could be posed.

2696 Mr Carey asked the Chair to consider changing the order of the agenda, recalling that this had been previously discussed and that members of the public seemed to leave after about two hours missing the presentations from operators and regulators. Mr Carey proposed that consideration of the previous meeting minutes, matters arising and action tracker should be moved to after the Sizewell A and B reports had been heard. **Chair agreed to try this** but cautioned that some of the outcomes of matters arising informed the later agenda items. Mr Carey gave his view that the remit of the meeting was to act as a conduit of information between the operators, regulators and the local community and that the attending public left before this happened.

2697 Ms Girling questioned what the regulators and operators take back from our meetings. Chair agreed to liaise with these individuals to understand how these meetings work for them. Mr Parr commented that the EA respond to the challenges and questions posed at these meetings and that although his sometimes involves considerable extra work that it was important that the public have this opportunity. Ms Girling stressed that it should be two way. Mr Parr emphasised that they were trying to communicate with a wider audience. Chair commented that it was not a negative reflection if questions were not asked but more a positive statement of clarity of understanding.

Meeting closed at 14.10

Next SSG meeting:

7pm on Thursday 4th June 2015 at Saxmundham Market Hall

Appendix 1: Declarations of Interest from SSG Members

Cllr Bailey:	Receives a pension from the Electricity Supply Industry
Mr Betson:	Station guide at Sizewell B Volunteer ranger – National Trust Member – RSPB
Mr Branton:	Receives a pension from the Electricity Supply Industry
Cllr Fellowes:	Councillor for Aldeburgh Town Council Conservative District Councillor for Aldeburgh and Aldringham and Thorpeness. Member of RSPB and National Trust
Mr Foy:	Secretary of UNITE Energy Branch based Sizewell covering A, B + newbuild sites
Ms Girling:	Chairperson of Campaign Against Nuclear Expansion (CANE) Secretary of Together Against Sizewell C (TASC) Member of RSPB, Suffolk Wildlife Trust, National Trust, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (Suffolk Coastal and National)
Cllr Hodgson:	Receives a pension from the Electricity Supply Industry
Cllr Howard:	Councillor on Leiston-cum-Sizewell Town Council Member of the Campaign Against Nuclear Expansion (CANE) Member of Together Against Sizewell C (TASC)
Cllr M Jones:	Husband works at Sizewell B
Cllr Nunn:	Vice Chairman of Suffolk Coasts and Heaths AONB Joint Advisory Committee
Cllr Plant:	None
Cllr Robertson:	Takes lodgers employed at the sites
Cllr N Smith:	None
Mr R Smith:	None
Mr Taylor:	Member of Suffolk Coastal Friends of the Earth Member of the Campaign Against Nuclear Expansion (CANE) Member of Together Against Sizewell C (TASC)
Mr Tucker:	Member of the RSPB
Mr Wilkinson:	Advisor to the Campaign Against Nuclear Expansion (CANE) Associate of the Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates Consultant to the Office for Nuclear Regulation Member of the UK Government's Geological Disposal Implementation board. Acting Chairperson of Together Against Sizewell C (TASC)

Appendix 2: Mr Busby's response to questions arising from the steam venting debate.

From Stuart Parr, EA Inspector, Sizewell B

Dear Mr Busby

I have agreed to give an update on this issue to the Sizewell SSG meeting due to take place on 5 March. However, I thought it would be useful to reply to your email in advance of the meeting and give a summary of the response I plan to give.

Summarily, I plan to make the following points:

Regulation of Steam Vent Discharges

- Under normal operational conditions, discharges of steam contaminated with radioactivity are subject to regulatory control by the Environment Agency (EA). Our permits, however, are not intended to cover accident conditions. The prevention of accidents at nuclear sites, such as the events at San Onofre, is the regulatory remit of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
- We set limits and conditions to the discharge of radioactive substances to the environment and this would include steam discharged from the Sizewell B secondary circuit during normal operation which contains low levels of tritium, fission products and activated particles.
- Sizewell B does monitor levels of radioactivity in the secondary circuit steam and the results indicate very low levels of radioactivity present: in the region of 0.05-0.2 Bq/ml of tritium with other contaminants usually at the limit of detection (<0.02 Bq/ml).
- Our permit requires Sizewell B to report all its discharges of radioactivity to the environment, including the discharge of radioactively contaminated steam from the secondary circuit when this takes place. Discharge monitoring results are reported to us on a monthly basis and are available on our Public Register. However, the monthly report covers all discharges of radioactive material to the environment during that period and any steam discharges would be so small in terms of radioactivity that they are insignificant within the context of the total discharges recorded. Tritium discharges, for example, are limited on an annual basis up to 3 TBq (3×10^{12} Bq), but even in the worst case scenario seen over the past few years, when steam venting took place for 3-4 days, the release of tritium would have less than 0.1% of this limit.

Environmental Effects & Monitoring

- Following dispersion in the atmosphere, a simplified release model I have used indicates that the deposition of tritium to land following a secondary steam venting event would be at levels indistinguishable from background radiation levels. Quantities of tritium in the environment are variable depending on local conditions but average, worldwide background levels for tritium in rainwater are about 1-4 Bq/l, much of which is natural (tritium is formed in the upper atmosphere) and a good proportion of the remainder originates from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the 1960s.
- Environmental monitoring does take place around Sizewell for fission products, activated particles and other isotopes, including tritium, throughout the year by the EA and the Food Standards Agency. We also require the operators of the Sizewell power stations to monitor the environment around the power stations.
- The environmental monitoring programmes use instrumentation for gamma radiation monitoring, radiation dose rate monitoring and take physical samples for radiochemical analysis – it would be impossible to detect background levels of tritium in the environment using instrumentation due to its weak, beta radiation energy signature, therefore laboratory analysis must be used to get accurate results. Detection levels for tritium in environmental samples analysed in the laboratory are good, with a limit of detection in the range of 1-5 Bq/l. Tritium's half-life of about 12.3 years allows plenty of opportunity for the detection of levels above background through these monitoring programmes.

- All environmental monitoring is either published in the annual *Radiation in Food and the Environment (RIFE)* report (for the EA's and FSA's monitoring results) or on our Public Register (for results obtained through the operators' monitoring programme). These programmes monitor various environmental media and include analysis for a range of radioactive substances, including tritium, fission products and activated particles. For your information, I attach a paper I recently presented to the SSG summarising the range of environmental monitoring that takes place around Sizewell.
- The EA does retain capability for routine and reactive environmental sampling and analysis for radioactive substances.
- There is no evidence from environmental monitoring that there is a risk to people or the environment from discharges made by the Sizewell power stations – dose assessments made using environmental monitoring data consistently indicate that radiation doses from all discharges made to the environment over a year are less than 1% of public dose limit. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that bespoke sampling and monitoring of the environment is required post-steam venting under normal operational conditions.
- During an accident event bespoke environmental monitoring would take place (in conjunction with the Food Standards Agency) both under plume and in the far field as part of the EA's emergency response role (the EA is one of the lead response organisations – known as a category 1 responder – in the event of an accident with an off-site release at a nuclear site).

Mr John Busby's reply:

At the first meeting held on 17 December 2012, SZB submitted a list of steam venting occurrences over the previous 10 years or so, but complained that it took a huge amount of staff effort to compile. Also the list did not go back to the plant start.

Having considered the matter over 2 years, our main demand is for adequate records to be kept of the dates and times of venting occurrences, showing the duration of the releases together with an estimate of the quantity of steam released during the occasions. Of great significance would then be a record of the wind directions, which would vary during the releases, which in some cases extend to several days. To the records would also be added the reasons for the releases.

After the last SSG meeting, SZB admitted that such records are not kept, nor is it willing to keep them. ONR claimed it had no powers to insist on such records to be kept, but that EA had. Hence the submission to your good self.

It is assumed that from the steam plume there will be droplet precipitation, so that in order to check whether a venting occurrence has resulted in contamination, the areas under the successive directions of the plume need to be defined and will depend on the wind directions and its speeds. For a post-venting assessment of possible fall-out and for dealing with any complaints, the records defined above are then crucial.

We accept that, if as SZB claims, there are no leaks between the primary and secondary circuits, there will be little radioactive contamination to monitor. This basically depends on the security of the 4 x 5,626 tubes in the four steam generators, as the primary circuit contains.

IAEA lists the activated contents of the primary circuit in its report "Modelling of Transport of Radioactive Substance in the Primary Circuit of Water-Cooled Reactors" IAEA-TECDOC-1672 and the constant failure of steam generator tubing is covered in its report "Heavy Component Replacement in Nuclear Power Plants: Experience and Guidelines" NP-T-32.

It is clear that a tubing failure cannot be ruled out. A leak occurring just before a steam venting occurrence may avoid detection in the plant and lead to a release of radioactivity in the steam. Even if a leak is detected, the plant may resort thereafter to natural circulation cooling and the associated steam venting when shutting down.

Knowing where steam venting plumes have gone over which areas will facilitate post-venting monitoring, will check on the adequacy of the in-house detection systems and give assurance to the public concerned in the aftermath of a steam venting occurrence.

We are therefore disappointed that you are unwilling to use your powers to insist on adequate records of steam venting occurrences being kept and which we consider to be a mandatory function of the station management. Also your reluctance to perform post-venting monitoring in the areas affected.