

**Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group**

**THE TWENTY-NINETH SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING  
HELD ON THURSDAY, 6 SEPTEMBER 2012, BRISBANE HOUSE HOTEL, LARGS**

**Present:**

**Magnox Ltd**

Mr Tony Bale (Chair)  
Mr Mark Stubbs

**Community Councillors**

Mr John Lamb - West Kilbride  
Mrs Rita Holmes – Fairlie (Vice Chair)  
Mr Allan Rice – Saltcoats

**Community Council Representatives**

Mr Douglas MacFarlane (Largs)

**Councillors**

Cllr Robert Barr  
Cllr Elizabeth McLardy

**In Attendance**

Ms Vicky Simm, Magnox Ltd  
Mr Reuben Phillips, Magnox Ltd  
Mrs Shelagh Milligan, Magnox Ltd  
Mr Sean Marshall, Magnox Ltd  
Ms Claire Cook, EDF Energy  
Mr Ewan Young, Scottish Government

Several members of the public were also in attendance

**Apologies:**

Mr Adam Stackhouse, Mr Chris Kemp, Cllr Alex McLean, Mr Stuart McGhie, Mr John Robertson and the Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team.

**EDF Energy**

Mr John Morrison

**NDA**

Mr Bill Hamilton

**ONR**

Mr Malek Ghannad

**SEPA**

Mr Keith Hammond

**North Ayrshire Council**

Mr Hugh McGhee

**THE TWENTY-NINETH HUNTERSTON SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING  
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BRISBANE HOUSE HOTEL, LARGS**

**1. CHAIRMAN'S OPENING REMARKS**

Mr Tony Bale welcomed everyone to the 29th Meeting of the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group (SSG).

**2. CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR UPDATES/CORRESPONDENCE**

Mr Bale advised that the Secretariat had received correspondence from the NDA Competition Team regarding the recent six week extension to the pre-qualification questionnaire period, following the announcement that EnergySolutions was for sale. Consequently, a request had been made to circulate the following announcement:

*"Following the announcement of the EnergySolutions sale process, the NDA has concluded that it would be appropriate to extend by 6 weeks, the response period for the pre-qualification questionnaire to 12th October 2012. The submission of questionnaires by interested parties is followed by a period of formal dialogue with those who have successfully pre-qualified, which lasts more than 6 months, before bidders submit tenders for evaluation. The NDA remains committed to completing the Competition by June 2014 as outlined by the bidder conference in Manchester, however, the milestones will be reviewed and we will keep you fully informed of any changes".*

**3. MATTERS ARISING FROM PREVIOUS MINUTES/ACTION POINTS**

Action 01 - Sean Balmer of the NDA to investigate the reimbursement of expenses.

**(Status: Complete)**

Action 02 – Colin Weir to investigate whether a drawing or sketch of the B Station reactor gaseous discharge route could be issued to Mr Rice.

**(Status: Complete)**

Action 03 - Adam Stackhouse to contact the Environment Agency to confirm their satisfaction with the regulator at Drigg and to confirm that unsatisfactory conditions had been rectified.

**(Status: On-going)**

Action 04 - Sean Marshall to seek clarification from Mr Jonathan Jenkin at the NDA on whether an application for funding had been received from or awarded to an Inverclyde Sports Centre project through the old funding scheme. Mr John Robertson was under the impression a large amount of funding had been awarded, however this has shown not to be the case. The only application received related to the construction of a £200k indoor sports hall.

Mr John Lamb stated there was an application four years previous from Inverclyde, which was sent back to Inverclyde for further clarification on costing which they failed to return.

Mr Jonathan Jenkin provided a full list of all applications that had been submitted to the old NDA scheme prior to 1 April 2012, including Inverclyde.

**(Status: Complete)**

#### **4. APPROVAL OF PREVIOUS MINUTES**

Mrs Rita Holmes directed the SSG to an anomaly on page four of the previous minutes (last paragraph) which read “Mrs Holmes enquired if their findings would be dependent”. Mrs Holmes advised that it should be replaced with “...if they were appearing as a witness it would be dependent upon their findings”.

Mr Rice directed the SSG to an anomaly on page five stating that in his opinion the paragraph read as if the blow down valve was connected to the granular charcoal. Mr Rice stated that in his opinion these were two completely different things. From within the public audience, Mr Andy Taylor agreed and advised that he would provide the Secretariat with a slightly redrafted minute to read “procedures for blow down valve operation have been amended”.

With these amendments noted, the minutes were proposed by Mrs Holmes and seconded by Mr Rice.

#### **5A. HUNTERSTON B STATION REPORT**

Mr John Morrison, deputising for Mr Colin Weir, took the report as read. Mr Morrison stated that with regards to the station safety performance, there had been no injuries in the period from July 2012.

With regards to community safety, Mr Morrison advised that the new guide dog had arrived and that it would take at least a year for the dog to be trained. Thereafter, it would be gifted to an individual within the community.

Mr Morrison stated that Hunterston B had its surveillance audit by Lloyds Register covering major industrial business standards ISO 9001, ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001, which cover quality, environment and industrial safety. He stated that Hunterston B had successfully demonstrated that their management systems were at a standard to be continued for the coming year.

Regarding the WANO peer review, Mr Morrison advised that this occurred in May 2012. Thirty peers from around the world conducted a review of safety and performance within their plants. No significant safety or performance issues were found. He added that Hunterston B was also commended on a number of strengths and good practices and that 16 gaps to excellence were received. Mr Morrison advised that the WANO peer review’s aim was to find areas of improvement, which Hunterston B would take on board and implement over the coming three years.

For environmental safety, Mr Morrison stated that Hunterston B had seen continuous regular inspections from SEPA and in particular with ONR for low level waste. No issues were noted.

Mr Morrison added that emergency arrangements were continuing in a full state of readiness and that there had been no significant radiological protection events in the period, although there was a focus on continual improvement.

Regarding generation, Mr Morrison stated that Hunterston B had been operating more or less on full load for the period with short load reductions for refuelling.

Mr Morrison highlighted an important company event during the period with the publication of the Energy Bill on 22 May 2012. He stated that final investment decisions would be taken with regards to the new nuclear power plant at Hinkley by the end of this year.

With regards to business and community, Mr Morrison advised that EDF Energy engaged significantly with the community and as such, the Olympic Games had been of particular focus whereby staff and members of the community had attended and volunteered at the Olympics. Hunterston B site held an Olympic Day to celebrate the working achievements of the staff with regards to the Olympics. This proved to be a success and a great team building opportunity for all.

Mr Morrison advised that the new Visitor Centre had opened on 31 August 2012 which was well attended and deemed a tremendous success. Mr Morrison hoped that local people would take the opportunity to visit the centre, although he noted that visits around the plant would require prior notice.

Cllr Robert Barr thanked Mr Morrison for his report on the Community. Cllr Barr advised that on 8 June 2012, two areas within North Ayrshire Council had been chosen to participate in the Olympic torch relay, one area being Barrmill. The local community wished to commemorate this and in turn, Hunterston staff and the apprentices made an inscribed time capsule which was filled and interned on 11 August 2012. Consequently, Cllr Barr wished to express his appreciation and that of the local community, onto Hunterston B.

Mr Rice enquired as to which plant defects were identified in the environmental safety report. Mr Morrison responded that anything identified would not significantly reduce safety margins and were primarily operational for pumps, valves and control instrumentation. Mr Rice stated that he would expect a planned maintenance for plant defects and enquired as to who would conduct this. Mr Andy Taylor advised that he had written this part of the report which was in the realm of "terms of defects" occurring on the plant. Mr Taylor added that there was a focus on safety to ensure there were no significant defects which had the potential to impact on the environment.

Mrs Holmes requested further information on the "16 gaps to excellence". Mr Morrison responded that they generally related to processes and how Hunterston B could improve on efficiency or effectiveness. Mr Morrison advised that a worldwide criteria detailed the excellence to which Hunterston B was aspiring. Mr Morrison added that 16 meaningful gaps for excellence were identified and these were expected to close within the next three years. Mrs Holmes enquired if an additional budget would be required for plugging the gaps for excellence. Mr Morrison responded that this may not be the case as in many cases, changing the way in which something is done is all that is required, which may involve the retraining of individuals.

Mr Bale requested further clarification on the shutdown. Mr Morrison responded that it was currently on day 20 and was on course. He stated all graphite core inspections had been completed successfully which was a statutory requirement, however no issues had been reported. Boiler inspections were half-way through outage and were due to be completed in early October.

Mr Rice requested further clarification on the boiler inspections. Mr Morrison explained that the two most important components in a reactor were the graphite core and the boilers as these could not be taken out and replaced. Mr Morrison stated that the options were to either

stop generating if they no longer worked, or repair them insitu. Mr Morrison went on to explain that the graphite core cannot be repaired but the boilers can, therefore they are regularly inspected. As the boilers are working at high temperatures and pressures, small cracks can appear. Mr Rice sought clarification that the pressure of the boiler was checked after repair. Mr Morrison confirmed a full pressure test was completed after repair.

Mr Rice made reference to discussions from the previous meeting when the lifting of pressure relief valves were discussed. Mr Rice wished clarification if this was where the pressure relief valves had come from. Mr Morrison confirmed that the boiler pressure relief valves are tested regularly which involves moving to check that they operate in the range that they are required to operate in for safety reasons. There is therefore a small escape of steam as a result, but that is perfectly normal.

## **5B. SEPA REPORT**

Mr Keith Hammond took the report as read however proposed further clarification with regards to radioactive substances. He advised that an inspection was conducted on 30 August 2012 which focused on solid and exempt waste from Hunterston B or waste being transferred for disposal to another facility. He stated nothing of significance was found during that inspection.

Mr Hammond stated that from the habits survey that was undertaken, feedback had been received from the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS) and they wished to pass on their gratitude to the community for being receptive. Mr Hammond advised that the next edition of RIFE 17 would cover the calendar year for 2011 and should be published next month.

Mrs Holmes requested further clarification on the enhancements to the programme. Mr Hammond responded that within the district survey, a number of documents had been identified as overlooked or in duplication. Recommendations had been made to combine these into a single document to reduce the overlap and potential confusion.

Mrs Homes advised that in the recent past, the SSG received information on the different sampling areas around the station, such as milk sampling, and enquired as to why these were no longer received. Mr Taylor responded that this information was contained in the "RIFE Report for Radiation in Food and the Environment". Mrs Holmes responded that this report was issued at a later stage and the SSG were previously issued with a quarterly sampling report. Mr Taylor could not recall this and stated that the purpose of the district survey sampling regime was to look for activity where it should not be or identify substances that had the potential to cause harm. Mr Taylor added that reports were regularly made to SEPA in relation to findings and that there were no significant ill effects.

Mrs Holmes enquired as to whether shellfish were sampled also. Mr Taylor responded that a number of products were sampled, such as representative stock and materials in the local area, which could contribute to public uptake if there were to be significant radioactivity in the environment. Mr Taylor advised that if no milk farms were in the vicinity, sampling would be conducted outside the area via the nearest milk farm. Mr Taylor added that the organisation was looking to develop the materials sampled. Mrs Holmes requested clarification if this was part of the enhancement. Mr Hammond advised that SEPA contacted CEFAS to undertake the radiological habit survey, which was conducted over the summer. Mr Hammond stated that CEFAS questioned people on what they ate in the local area, their habits and how long they spent on the beach etc. Thereafter, CEFAS would calculate the most critical group.

Mrs Holmes wished clarification that the oyster farm at Hunterston was being sampled, as the product was shipped abroad. Mr Taylor was unaware of the oyster farm, however stated that they tested fish and other samples from various places within the local catchment area, which was confirmed as normal practice. Mr Taylor advised that the process was continually under review as habits within the local area would change. Mr Hugh McGee confirmed that the oyster farm was still operational and that environmental health took samples on a monthly basis, not for radioactivity, but purely for hygiene purposes.

Mrs Holmes enquired as to whether the variation application had been carried out. Mr Hammond stated it was his understanding that it had not been carried out to date. Mrs Holmes wished to know if it was a temporary variation notice, however Mr Hammond clarified that this was not the case and stated it was a permanent variation and that there was no notification requirement.

Mrs Holmes raised concern regarding steam released through these valves and that there may be an additional radioactive burden for emissions. Mr Hammond confirmed this to be the case. At this point in the discussion, Mr Taylor interjected and requested that the discussion revert back to the release valves, highlighting that the authorisation variation being discussed was on the main gas release valves, not steam. Mr Taylor advised that the discharge route was filtered, so in the event of a main gas relief valve having to operate, it would create a release of reactor gas through a filtered route. The filtration built into that route is slightly different and slightly less effective than the normal operation reactor blow down, however the reactor gas is the same. Mrs Holmes wished clarification on whether there would be an increase in emissions. Mr Taylor responded that there would be no increase in emissions, adding that at the start of reactor three's outage, the reactor had been blown down to zero atmospheric pressure into the environment. Mr Allan Rice queried if that was through the charcoal filter. Mr Taylor confirmed this was the case.

Mrs Holmes made reference to outage and the blowing of gas or steam and enquired if there would be an increase in the levels of radioactivity into the air. Mr Taylor responded that there would be an increase immediately at the time of blow down, however this would be considered a normal, authorised discharge. Mrs Holmes enquired whether there would be peaks in the outage. Mr Taylor confirmed that was the case and stated that those peaks were reported in the authorised returns to SEPA in terms of activity discharged into the environment. Mr Taylor advised that if there was a reactor outage during a particular month, it would show as an increased discharge. Mrs Holmes requested clarification as to how the peaks were recorded and whether the recordings were hourly or daily and detailed what had been found. Mr Taylor responded that they had come to an agreement with SEPA that a monthly summary would be provided and any deeper analysis would be subject to periodic review. Mr Taylor added that small atmospheric gaseous discharges were on-going and spikes or peaks occurred with planned outages.

In addition, Mr Hammond advised that there was an annual limit which could not be breached for a number of radionuclides. Mr Hammond added that there were quarterly notification levels and weekly advisory levels which were set at significantly lower limits which, if exceeded, required SEPA to be informed.

Mr Bale sought clarification as to whether consent levels had been breached at any time in the last four years. Mr Taylor confirmed that consent levels had not been breached.

Mr Rice enquired if the data could be presented to the SSG in graphical form. Mr Taylor confirmed that a discharge data could be provided in graphical form, however Mr Morrison was unsure how valuable that information would be to the SSG. Mr Bale actioned B Station to measure the discharge rates from now until the next SSG meeting in December and to provide a chart showing the data over a 24 hour, weekly and monthly period. **(Action 01)**

## **5C. ONR REPORT**

Mr Malek Ghannad commenced by advising that there had been no significant safety issues reported during the quarter.

Mr Ghannad advised that in May 2012, members of the USA Nuclear Regulatory Commission visited the station to compare pressurised water reactors. Commissioner Magwood had made a number of positive comments about the station, such as its operation.

With regards to outage, Mr Ghannad advised that reactor three was shut down for the strategy outage on 17 August 2012. Mr Ghannad added that nine ONR inspectors and specialist inspectors had visited that week, however this was considered quite normal. Mr Ghannad advised that the specialist inspectors included three fire safety inspectors, two nuclear inspectors and one conventional specialist. No significant safety issues had been reported.

Mr Ghannad advised that several minor safety issues had been raised, such as scratches on a fire door. Although the door was still fit for purpose, it was deemed prudent safety protocol to replace it, which had subsequently been done. In conclusion, Mr Ghannad advised that specialists were due to inspect the results of the boilers next week.

Mr Bale raised concerns with regards to previous allegations regarding fire safety. Mr Bale asked for clarification that during the ONR's latest inspection, the inspectors would have taken on board what had been said with regard to allegations. Mr Ghannad confirmed that every allegation made had been satisfactorily investigated and had met the specifications required for operating a Nuclear Power Station.

Mrs Holmes requested clarification on the marking of the site boundary. Mr Ghannad explained that every nuclear licence site had 36 licence conditions and site marking boundary was considered one of the licence conditions. He advised that these were checked once every three years to ensure the signs for the boundary were in good condition. They were also a visual assurance to visitors that they were entering a nuclear licenced site.

## **6. HUNTERSTON A SITE REPORT**

Mr Stubbs took the report as read however he wished to highlight on a few points.

Mr Stubbs advised that Hunterston A continued to have a good safety and environmental performance and had no significant events since the last meeting. It had now been over six months since the last lost time accident.

Mr Stubbs stated that Hunterston A was always seeking continuous improvement, including comparing and learning from other businesses. As such, he advised that members of staff had recently visited Hunterston B Site and had taken away some good ideas and best practices to implement at Hunterston A.

Mr Stubbs advised that the Site continued to strive to improve its safety and environmental standards through adopting best practices. Recent examples included improvements to working at height, safety barriers and signage.

With regards to draining and decontaminating the cartridge cooling pond (CCP), Mr Stubbs advised that the current water level was at 13' 6", therefore a third of the pond had already been emptied. He added that dewatering was progressing extremely well.

Mr Stubbs made reference to the historical contaminated land around CP7 and advised that the first phase was complete. As the contamination was underneath the Site access road, a new temporary road had been constructed which was brought into use on Wednesday 5 September 2012. Mr Stubbs advised that this would enable the Site to commence the main body of remediation work, with the installation of an insitu engineered barrier to contain the contaminated land, which is scheduled to be completed by the end of the financial year.

Mr Stubbs advised that the Wet ILW Retrieval and Encapsulation Plant had been constructed earlier in the year and the non-active commissioning was on schedule. He added that Hunterston A were looking forward to start retrieving, encapsulating and then transferring wet ILW to the ILW store by the end of the financial year.

Mr Stubbs highlighted that all discharges remained well within authorisation limits, however due to the work being done on the CCP dewatering, the volume of liquid being discharged had increased significantly and would continue at this higher rate until the pond was emptied around mid-2014.

Mr Lamb requested clarification on the radioactive discharges and whether the solid waste metal transferred to Studsvik was being transferred by road or rail. From the public audience, Mr Reuben Phillips explained that it would be transferred by road in the same containers as other solid radioactive waste. Mr Phillips advised that the containers were reused unless they were being transferred to the Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR), where they would be buried underground. Studsvik would clean the containers before returning them and they were also checked on and off-site to ensure there was no contamination.

Mrs Holmes requested clarification on the location of the metal containers once cleaned. Mr Phillips advised that they are reused and that Studsvik and other facilities would decontaminate the metal to a useable level which would be processed as scrap metal into the market.

Mrs Holmes enquired as to how many containers would be required at Hunterston A. Mr Phillips estimated that this year there may be 20 containers for disposal in total. He also advised that there was a metal decontamination facility on site. Mr Stubbs added that the surface contamination was jet blasted off, which in turn allowed the metal to be reused.

Mrs Holmes asked if the material removed from the metal would eventually be transferred to the ILW Store. Mr Stubbs confirmed that materials removed only had low levels of contamination and would therefore end up as either very low level or low level waste and sent to LLWR for disposal.

Mrs Holmes requested clarification regarding the water ingress into the solid ILW waste retrieval facility. Mr Stubbs reminded the SSG of the extreme rainfall that affected the community last December which resulted in a high water table and some water entering this building. The building is still empty and is not due to become operational until late in 2013 or 2014. He advised that work was near completion to ensure the building was watertight. Mrs Holmes wished clarification that this would not reoccur which Mr Stubbs confirmed.

## 6A. NDA REPORT

Mr Hamilton commenced with reference to the competition and confirmed the contents of the letter read earlier by Mr Bale. He advised that a review was taking place with some changes to the short term milestones, and in terms of taking the competition forward, the NDA could see no reason why it would not be completed by June 2014 when it was scheduled to finish. Mr Hamilton reiterated that EnergySolutions was for sale. He stated that the NDA were not in control of the buying and selling process, however they had an absolute right of veto of the buyer. He stated that the buyer had to be a fit and proper operator of nuclear plants.

Mr Hamilton advised that the NDA had lost both of the Ministers from the Department of Energy and Climate Change. These Ministers had a role to play in NDA activities and were particularly responsible for decommissioning, waste and the search for the Geological Disposal Facility. He advised that the Coalition Government in Westminster had named two new Junior Ministers, Mr John Haines and Mr Gregg Barker, however at the present time, the NDA were unaware of their remits.

With regards to MOP 9, Mr Hamilton stated that the SSG members should have received a copy of this paper, however added that it was irrelevant to Hunterston A as fuel was no longer there. He summarised the MOP 9 report by highlighting that the difference between the previous MOP was the overall holistic plan for handling all spent fuel from all of the Magnox sites, ensuring it was re-processed and into interim storage, ready for final disposal. He stated the previous versions of the MOP (1 – 8) had an end date, however the end date would not be as quoted within the report, as the Sellafield plant was over 40 years old and the reprocessing route had been irregular. It was therefore virtually impossible to provide a definitive end date.

Mr Hamilton advised that under NDA guidance, extra funding had been given to Sellafield and the licence company had been working to bring forward the improvement programme for the reprocessing plant. He stated that the range of dates mentioned in the performance range table were the dates that the NDA hoped to finish. In addition, Mr Hamilton advised that the NDA had spent money with the licence company on improvement programmes, making the efficiency and throughput of the Magnox reprocessing plants healthier and more robust.

Mr Hamilton discussed intermediate level waste storage solutions for Central and Southern Scotland and in particular, the recently published credible options report which. In summarising the report, Mr Hamilton made reference to the two credible options; one being the continuation of the current base line and the second being the consolidation of Hunterston B's sludge and resins at Hunterston A and the continuation of the current base line for all other sites and wastes. He stated that the report also identified the opportunity to move the equivalent of eleven 3m<sup>3</sup> packages of resin from Torness to Hunterston A, Chapelcross or Rosyth. He quoted from the report stating *"...no further work will be done on the Torness waste options in the near future as the waste is not planned to be packaged for some time and also there is sufficient capacity for the relatively small volume of this waste in all the stores"*.

Mr Hamilton explained the outcome if the option to consolidate the Hunterston B sludge and resin in the ILW store was preferred. He stated that the equivalent of 76 packages of Hunterston B sludge and resin could be stored in the ILW Store in addition to the 1179 packages which were estimated to arise from Hunterston A. He reiterated that the other credible option would be to leave the material in its current location. In conclusion, Mr Hamilton advised that the NDA would take account of any stakeholder views that emerged before a final decision was taken and the preferred option published.

Mr Bale requested clarification on MOP 9 and Mr Hamilton's comment that it was not applicable to Hunterston A, advising that there was still high dose rate items (HDRIs) at Hunterston A. Mr Stubbs responded that Hunterston A had two HDRIs which would be released this year. Mr Hamilton advised that the NDA did not include these as it was in such a small quantity. Mr Bale requested Mr Stubbs keep the SSG advised on the progress of the HDRIs and how they will be dealt with. **(Action 02)**

Mr Bale made reference to the option paper and reiterated the Hunterston SSG's preference that the ILW Store be used for Hunterston waste only. Mrs Holmes added that when the Store was initially applied for, it was noted as being for Hunterston A waste only. She added that although she could see the merits of storing Hunterston B waste, there would be other considerations to take into account. Mr Lamb added that it was up to the NDA to effectively consult with the SSG and local communities regarding the credible options report and what was considered acceptable in the existing store.

Mr Bale advised that he and Mrs Holmes had discussions with the Scottish Office in which they dismissed military arising from it. Mr Hamilton responded that he had been quite clear in stating what the credible options would be. He added that he had also provided the number of potential packages, the exact nature of the material and exactly where it is from. The report had been published with clear consultation and engagement with the Scottish Government.

Mrs Holmes made reference to the Hunterston A ONR report quoting "*...meetings have been held with the licensee to discuss three proposals by other bodies for industrial developments near the site*". Mrs Holmes enquired as to who these bodies were. Mr Stubbs responded that one was Scottish Power High Voltage Direct and advised that there was also on-going work with wind energy. Mr Ghannad confirmed the third to be the coal fire proposal.

Mr Ghannad stated that for the three developments, it had to be clear that emergency response did not affect the site. He also stated for the coal fire proposal, the licensee had to raise objections which Hunterston B had done and ONR had supported. However, it was noted that this proposal had now been withdrawn. He stated that the wind power plant had no impact on Hunterston B due to its proximity, therefore ONR had no objections. Mr Ghannad stated that he thought the offshore wind generators would be out-with the 2.4km zone.

Cllr Barr requested clarification on whether the ONR were being consulted with regards to the wind turbines. Mr Ghannad responded that ONR were not in consultation as it was a Council matter, however ONR had to ensure it was in the detailed emergency planning zone. He added that the Council would advise ONR if an application was received.

## **7. PUBLIC Q&A SESSION**

There were no further questions from the public gallery.

## **8. DATE AND VENUE OF NEXT MEETING**

The next meeting will be held on Thursday 6th December 2012 at the Lauriston Hotel, Ardrossan at 1.00 pm.

**Mr Tony Bale**  
**SSG Chair**

## ACTION LIST

### 29<sup>th</sup> Site Stakeholder Group Meeting

Thursday, 6 September 2012

No	Action	Responsible	Target Date	Status/Comments
01	Hunterston B station to measure the discharge rates from now until the next SSG Meeting and present the results in diagrammatic form over a 24 hour, weekly and monthly period.	Mr Morrison	06/12/12	
02	Mr Stubbs to update the SSG on the progress of legacy fuel at Hunterston A and how it will be dealt with.	Mr Stubbs	06/12/12	
03	<b>Carried forward from 7 June 2012</b> To contact the Environment Agency to confirm their satisfaction with the regulator at Drigg and that unsatisfactory conditions had been rectified.	Mr Stackhouse	06/09/12	Ongoing