

Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group

**THE THIRTIETH SITE STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING
HELD ON THURSDAY, 6 DECEMBER 2012, LAURISTON HOTEL, ARDROSAN**

Present:

Magnox Ltd

Mr Tony Bale (Chair)
Mr Derek Rooney
Mr Mark Stubbs

Community Councillors

Mr John Lamb - West Kilbride
Mrs Rita Holmes – Fairlie (Vice Chair)
Mr Allan Rice – Saltcoats

Community Council Representatives

Mr Douglas MacFarlane (Largs)

Councillors

Cllr Robert Barr
Cllr Tom Marshall
Cllr Alex McLean

In Attendance

Mr Angus Cochran-Patrick, Hunterston Estate
Mr Reuben Phillips, Magnox Ltd
Mrs Heather Robertson, Magnox Ltd
Mr Paul Buckley, Magnox Ltd
Ms Claire Cook, EDF Energy
Mr Allan MacRae, EDF Energy
Mr Andy Taylor, EDF Energy
Mr Ewan Young, Scottish Government

EDF Energy

Mr John Morrison

ONR

Mr Malek Ghannad
Mr Chris Kemp

SEPA

Mr Keith Hammond

North Ayrshire Council

Mr Hugh McGhee

National Farmers Union

Mr William Jack

Several members of the public were also in attendance

Apologies:

Mr Colin Weir, Dr Jane Cooper and Strathclyde Police.

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HELD ON THURSDAY, 6 DECEMBER 2012
LAURISTON HOTEL, ARDROSSAN**

1. CHAIRMAN'S OPENING REMARKS

Mr Tony Bale welcomed everyone to the 30th meeting of the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group (SSG).

2. CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR UPDATES/CORRESPONDENCE

Mr Bale noted the sad loss of two supporters of the Hunterston SSG; Mr John Reid and Lady Sonia, mother of Mr Angus Cochran-Patrick, and offered best wishes and condolences to both families.

Mr Bale advised that correspondence had been received from Mr Harry McEachan, Secretary of Largs Community Council, informing the SSG of their wish for Mr Douglas McFarlane to continue as their representative.

In addition, a press release had been issued by the NDA on 3 December 2012 with regards to the Magnox/RSRL bidders competition. Five organisations had passed the pre-qualification stage and would now participate in a period of dialogue lasting six months. Mr Bale advised that the SSG Chair and Vice Chair had been informed of this press release with copies available on request.

Mrs Holmes advised that she had attended two meetings on behalf of the SSG – Scottish Sites on 31 October 2012 and National Stakeholder Group on 29-30 October. This included various topics and a session from the NDA regarding the Magnox/RSRL bidders competition. Mrs Holmes listed the companies who had qualified as being: Reactor Sites Solutions (Bechtel, EnergySolutions), The Babcock Fluor Partnership, CAS Restoration Partnership (CH2M Hill, Areva, Serco) and Amec/Atkins.

At the recent Scottish Sites meeting attended by Mrs Holmes and Mr John Lamb, it had been noted that Vulcan, who have the MOD site adjacent to Dounreay, did not attend which left a gap in the dialogue on management of the inventory of Scottish and UK waste.

3. MATTERS ARISING FROM PREVIOUS MINUTES

Action 01 - Mr John Morrison, Hunterston B to measure the discharge rates between September 2012 and December 2012 SSG meetings and present the results in diagrammatic form over a 24 hour, weekly and monthly period.

Mr Morrison informed the SSG of B Station's intention to arrange a session at the Visitors Centre for those interested in a presentation of data. Mr Andy Taylor took an action to arrange a suitable date and time which would be communicated to members via the Secretariat.

(Status: On-going)

Action 02 – Mr Mark Stubbs, Hunterston A to update the SSG on the progress of legacy fuel and how it would be dealt with.

Mr Bale noted that Ms Heather Robertson, Hunterston A Engineering Manager, would give a presentation on this topic later in the meeting. Mr Stubbs informed the SSG that high dose rate items were recovered from the Cartridge Cooling Pond and safely and securely stored

within a shielded flask. He added that the Site was undertaking planning and trials associated with the dispatching of fuel to Sellafield. Initially Mr Bale intimated for Action 02 status to remain open until such times as fuel departs Site. In conclusion however, as an update had been received, this action could be considered closed with the understanding that Mr Stubbs would continue to update the SSG via his routine quarterly report. **(Status: Closed)**

Action 03 - Mr Adam Stackhouse to contact the Environment Agency to confirm their satisfaction with the regulator at Drigg and that unsatisfactory conditions had been rectified.

Due to Mr Stackhouse's inability to attend the meeting, this action remained ongoing. **(Status: On-going)**

4. APPROVAL OF PREVIOUS MINUTES

No amendments were noted within the previous minutes, which were subsequently proposed by Cllr Robert Barr and seconded by Mr John Lamb.

5A. HUNTERSTON B STATION REPORT

Mr John Morrison, deputising for Mr Colin Weir, took the report as read.

Mr Morrison advised that B Station had been granted a further life extension of seven years to 2023. There had been no injuries, lost time incidents or significant environmental safety events recorded within the period with the recent outage proving to be very successful. With regards to emergency arrangements, Mr Morrison confirmed that it had been a successful year of demonstrating the ability to react appropriately to any emergency, including counter terrorism, emergency planning and preparedness.

Mr Morrison noted that with regard to radiological issues, there had been no events over the year resulting in more than three years without incident. He added that it had been a good generating period with the only time outwith this being for statutory outage on Reactor three and on-load refuelling.

Mr Morrison stated that the station was ahead of its business plan and losses were lowest across the fleet of advanced gas-cooled reactors in the UK. He highlighted the excellent response to the opening of the Visitors Centre and informed the SSG of recent visits by MSP's, MP's, the French Ambassador to the UK and Chief Operating Officer of the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR). Mr Morrison indicated that apprentice information days would also be on-going throughout the coming month.

Cllr Barr expressed his congratulations to the station on its extension, ensuring job security to 2023. Mrs Rita Holmes reminded the SSG of the Periodic Safety Review in 2015, highlighting that it would be the ONR who would allow continuation. In response, Mr Malek Ghannad, ONR, offered confirmation, advising that each 10 year safety case was reviewed against modern standards with the next one due in 2015/16. Mr Ghannad explained that maintenance was carried out to comply with licence conditions and monitoring was continuous.

Mrs Holmes enquired as to the type of maintenance carried out regarding the Reactor Three outage. Mr Morrison responded that the boilers and graphite core had been inspected with both in good condition for positive output. Mr Morrison commented that the maintenance work carried out at Reactors Three and Four was similar. Mrs Holmes asked at what stage it would be deemed too difficult to install control rods. Mr Morrison explained that the core was inspected every two to four years and the station was looking for any mechanisms whereby the channels had been damaged. He added that at some point, eventually the core would become ineffectual but that was well beyond 2023.

Mr Morrison confirmed that it was a statutory requirement for the station to have a thorough inspection, so in the event of a large earthquake, they would be in the position to shut down easily. He stated that nitrogen injection systems were in place to hold down the reactor and control rods were used as a primary shut down mechanism. Mrs Holmes asked whether any core problems would affect fuel channels. Mr Morrison clarified that the fuel was inside but the rods were outside to allow the reactor to run. Once the rods were insitu, the reactor shuts down but the fuel doesn't move. He added that refuel takes place on a reactor every 10 weeks between six or seven channels amongst over 300 channels of fuel, therefore it was a very small proportion.

In relation to the mention of an earthquake, Mr Bale enquired as to what size of earthquake would be envisaged to damage the core and whether one had ever been experienced in the UK. Mr Morrison confirmed that whilst no earthquake of this intensity had been experienced within the UK, this did not stop them designing for that extreme. Mr Morrison stated that the plant was designed against a 1G-force earthquake with chances of such an earthquake being extremely small.

Mrs Holmes enquired if there were to be a problem with the graphite core and it affected the channel for the rods, would this apply to the channel for the fuel. Mr Morrison stated that if a core was damaged, the station may not be able to remove the fuel but would monitor any change in the core that might in the future cause a restriction. Mr Malek Ghannad added that the fuel was within a graphite sleeve, with graphite safety cases in place and it was his understanding from specialist assessors that there were no issues with fuel blockage.

At this point in the discussion, a member of the public made reference to recent speculation that Hunterston B may be extended beyond 2023 and enquired whether anyone could offer a realistic expectation of its duration beyond 2023, if the extension was granted. In response, Mr Morrison stated that any extension would be dependent on the condition of graphite core and boilers, in addition to how safe and economically viable it was to keep the plant operating. The company would make this decision in future years, as the safety case was legally valid until 2023.

Mr John Lamb enquired as to whether there was a reason B Station did not release an embargoed press release to notify the SSG of the extension prior to public announcement. Mr Lamb felt this would have allowed SSG members to review potential questions from external parties. Mr Morrison explained that there were significant commercial implications in making such an announcement and, due to being bound by Commerce and the Government, EDF felt it inappropriate to inform the SSG prior to the announcement. Mr Morrison suggested that the public relations team would be happy to take any points or questions from the SSG and provide more information as required. From within the public audience, Ms Clare Cook confirmed that from a legal point of view it was not possible to make any notification to SSG or send letters in advance of the announcement.

Mrs Holmes made reference to Mr Morrison's report and requested clarification on the enhancements to environmental monitoring as requested by SEPA. Mr Andy Taylor, Environment Secretary, confirmed that some enhancements related to the scope and nature of the sampling points and also to the quantity of materials taken in. He added that the request to review was a normal process and there may be some reductions/increases in areas, with a process of continual review to check that the assumptions made were still valid and in conjunction with the habit survey carried out.

Mrs Holmes advised that many were unaware of the existence of an oyster farm. Mr Taylor indicated that a small amount of progress had been made in this area and permission had been requested to participate in next year's environmental and monitoring programme. Mr Taylor agreed to update the group as this progressed.

Mrs Holmes informed the SSG of her attendance on 6 November 2012 at an ONR forum in London which focused on stress tests. At this forum, Mrs Holmes learned that there had been a large table-top exercise at Hunterston in relation to emergency planning which she had been unaware of. Mr Morrison explained that post Fukushima, emergency preparedness had evolved and more exotic scenarios were being tested to ascertain response levels. He clarified that these exercises, in support of the Japanese Event Recovery Programme, were continual as opposed to one "big" table-top exercise event. Mrs Holmes enquired as to the possibility of a presentation on Enhanced Emergency Plans at the next SSG to which Mr Morrison agreed. **(Action 01)**

Mr Bale congratulated Hunterston B on its extension and their intention to recruit more apprentices. He added that improvements were encouraging following the Wakeman Report and post Fukushima, with expansion instilling more confidence into the local area.

5B. SEPA REPORT

Mr Keith Hammond took the report as read. He noted that, with regard to Radioactive Substances Act authorisation, SEPA attended an EDF regulators meeting to discuss corporate issues and also a Radwise meeting with EDF and ONR to discuss the generation and disposal of radioactive waste. Mr Hammond added that the latest edition of Radioactivity in the Environment (No17) was now available. The inventory for 2011, which was published in October, was also available on the SEPA website.

With reference to discharges, Mrs Holmes noted the differences in the main pathways for dosage between Chapelcross and Hunterston. Mr Hammond explained that a habit survey was carried out every five years to determine the activities of people in the local areas. Various factors differed from area to area which resulted in differing "at risk" groups. He also highlighted that there were different discharges at Chapelcross due to it being a decommissioned site.

Mrs Holmes enquired if there was any update on Hydrazine. Mr Hammond confirmed that this was a collaborative approach with EDF to establish best practice for containment. Mr Hammond noted that EDF were pioneering in this field and scorings would be carried out at various sites. A meeting is scheduled for May 2013, the outcome of which would hopefully result in the establishment of best practice. Mr Allan Rice asked how much Hydrazine storage there was on B Station. Mr Taylor confirmed the Station took delivery of 1m³ of Hydrazine which was transferred into the building and used in very small quantities within the turbine. Mr Taylor added that the Station were working on best practice storage with SEPA and at present, the material remained banded, stored and protected with appropriate measures in place.

5C. ONR REPORT

Mr Malek Ghannad, ONR indicated that a number of site inspections, specialist inspections and Reactor three outage inspections had been carried out on various dates throughout the quarter. Mr Ghannad noted that Reactor four had operated at nominal full load with no significant safety issues recorded.

Mrs Holmes requested further clarification on the tabled information relating to approval and specifications. Mr Ghannad indicated that an executive summary of all project summary reports was undertaken. He added that this was a licence instrument to improve project assessment reports and took information from all assessors. He explained that for approval, the findings would be forwarded to the Deputy Chief Inspector for signage.

Mr Ghannad gave example of a recent safety case where approval had been sought for stage three fuel only. He indicated that there were various types of fuel available, and that all fuel used at Hunterston was robust with the approval that it would be treated in the same way as others. Mr Ghannad stated that on 9 August 2012, agreement had been given to modify nitrogen injection. Mr Ghannad explained that whilst super articulated control rods were used for shut down, hold down nitrogen was injected and plans were in place for a new nitrogen plant. An agreement from ONR for Reactor three outage and significant safety element was in place, with a similar request made for Reactor four in the near future.

6. HUNTERSTON A SITE REPORT

Mr Mark Stubbs took the report as read and highlighted some areas. With regards to industrial safety performance, Hunterston A has now gone a period of nine months since its last lost time accident. Mr Stubbs spoke of good progress in relation to the draining and decontamination of the pond, stating that the depth had gone from 21ft 6 inches in November 2011 to a current depth of 10ft 8 inches.

Mr Stubbs spoke of the land remediation project (Catch-Pit Seven compound) and the Site's long-term commitment to ensuring the contamination within the area is contained. Due to this type of work being fairly novel to the nuclear industry, Mr Stubbs explained that proven knowledge had been taken from other industries and specialist contractors who had experienced this type of work. He indicated some of the contamination had been closer to the surface than expected which made the job more onerous in terms of monitoring and dealing with waste. As always, the Site were applying high standards of safety and environment management. Mr Stubbs added that SEPA had been on site on various occasions to monitor the situation and the Site had worked closely with the regulator. Mr Stubbs noted that this work was planned to finish during February 2013. He explained that as contamination was near surface, it was likely that the newly constructed temporary road, which is routed around the remediated area, would be upgraded and made permanent.

Mr Stubbs did highlight that an event had occurred within the CP7 compound area. He explained that routine operations are carried out where water is pumped from the drain system and collected within intermediate bulk containers (IBCs). Following an agreement with SEPA to empty up to ten of these IBCs each day, an unintended error caused three to be emptied containing 3m³ of potentially mildly contaminated water from near-by, which was in-turn inadvertently discharged as part of operations. SEPA agreed this was a compliance issue as opposed to an environmental issue, however a further investigation was being carried out. Mr Stubbs confirmed that signage and the use of human performance tools could have been better, and this was something that had been improved upon since the event in order to prevent recurrence. Mr Stubbs finished by stating that the project team had gone to great efforts to identify foreseeable environmental risks during the planning of the work and, if any issues were raised, they would continue to be reported openly in order to learn from them in future.

With regard to Solid ILW retrieval, Mr Stubbs reported the solid active waste bunker retrieval facility had completed its performance trials, resulting in the building being water-tight. The

cross-site transporter vehicle, used to transfer waste to the ILW Store, was on site and undergoing tests. With regards to the pacification of fuel element debris, Mr Stubbs advised that a special plant was in place to retrieve wet ILW and encapsulate it through an inactive commissioning process. Mr Stubbs concluded that the site continued to safely deliver the decommissioning work on behalf of the NDA.

A member of the public gallery asked if Mr Stubbs could estimate the value of the land remediation work and the best and worst case scenario. Mr Stubbs responded by advising that various issues had surrounded the initial plans to remove the contaminated land with associated costs of £8million. This technology, where the affected land is isolated by a Bentonite wall, was decided upon as the preferred option, with anticipated costs of nearly £4million. Mr Stubbs confirmed work was progressing well.

Cllr Robert Barr enquired if consideration was being given to the recruitment of apprentices in the future. Mr Hammond recognised Magnox's proud history, however informed the SSG of the decision not to take on apprenticeships across the Magnox fleet. Mr Bale indicated that questions may arise in relation to adhering to the Energy Act which clearly stated that investment in the community must be undertaken. He queried how Magnox planned to justify not having apprentices within an industry that was spending millions of pounds a year. It was felt that this decision would be discussed further at national stakeholder groups.

Mr Hugh McGhee asked for clarification on the MAETP noted on page three of the report. Mr Stubbs clarified that this stood for Modular Active Effluent Treatment Plant, which used a modern filter system for removing particles and an ion exchange process for soluble radionuclides.

Mrs Holmes noted the project had segregated the work into five phases to deliberately minimise the risk of unauthorised releases. Mr Stubbs confirmed the incident had occurred at stage two of the works. Mrs Holmes asked for clarification as to whether this was an explanation for Magnox's decision not to have apprentices. Mr Stubbs confirmed that apprentices worked alongside experienced personnel and that in this event an experienced personnel made the error. Magnox supervisors worked with contractor supervisors and the job had been closely supervised.

6B. SEPA REPORT

Mr Adam Stackhouse had submitted apologies for absence, and therefore any questions regarding the SEPA report would be noted and addressed at a future date.

Mr Allan Rice requested clarification of SEPA's comments on this ongoing investigation. Mr Hammond advised that he was not involved in the investigation, but confirmed that it was still on-going with facts still to be ascertained. Mr Rice requested a copy of the investigation report once complete. **(Action 02)**

6C. ONR REPORT

Mr Chris Kemp informed the SSG that the licensee had issued a programme in relation to the restart of the encapsulation plant, which had been suspended in 2009 to allow the Site to review methods for dealing with waste. He confirmed that there had been visits to Site since the last SSG meeting, which reviewed all plants for processing and storing low level waste. Attention had been paid to the ILW Store itself, ensuring it was ready to receive its first package.

Mr Bale enquired as to Mr Kemp's involvement with regards to the CP7 compound. Mr Kemp clarified that as regulator of safety, whilst it was of interest, there had been nothing to suggest that this event had any significant safety implication.

7. ILW STRATEGY PRESENTATION

Mrs Heather Robertson, Engineering Manager at Hunterston A, gave a presentation on solid intermediate level waste (ILW) strategy and the following discussion ensued.

Mrs Holmes asked for further information on the two options for dealing with the waste, thus enabling members of the public to decide which the better environmental option was. Mr Stubbs clarified that with FED dissolution, there was an excellent treatment plant available with activity being contained and concentrated and discharges limited. Mr Stubbs gave assurance that the encapsulation programme included a challenging but realistic schedule which the Site would work hard to deliver.

Mr Lamb asked that in view of the fact that they would be going back to total encapsulation of all materials, would this effect the number of packages going into the store. Mr Stubbs confirmed that the store was being reconfigured to take approximately 2500 packages. He explained that Hunterston A would produce around 1600 packages, resulting in space for around another 900 packages. Mr Stubbs added that consultations were still ongoing and local feedback suggested that people did not want waste from outwith the area stored at Hunterston. It was however deemed generally favourable to store Hunterston B's waste, which was expected to produce around 300 packages, rather than building a second store. On this basis, Mr Stubbs suggested that there would be further consultation with North Ayrshire Council regarding the implications of placing Hunterston B's waste in the ILW Store.

Mr Rice enquired whether the waste could be retrieved from the ILW Store if required. Mrs Robertson confirmed that the waste would be encapsulated and therefore could not be recovered in its same form. However she did state that the stainless steel boxes could be retrieved.

Mrs Holmes enquired as to why the encapsulation plant had been put on hold and noted concerns regarding ungrouted waste being stored for long periods of time. In response, Mrs Robertson advised that the waste was currently unencapsulated and a safety case was in place to look at temporarily storing waste within the ILW Store until the encapsulation plant was built and available. This demonstrated that, in effect, there was very little difference. Mrs Robertson clarified that for long-term storage, material would be encapsulated and grouted.

Mr Bale raised concern that there would now be twice the movement and cross-site transport which were all high-risk movements. Mrs Robertson confirmed whilst not ideal, the Site had investigated the number of movements and could demonstrate that it will be carried out safely in terms of transport and in shielded packages. There are great benefits storing the unencapsulated ILW as it allows retrieval and encapsulation of the bunker one waste to begin much earlier.

Mr Kemp advised that his organisation and other bodies allowed the encapsulation plant design to be put on hold, stating that ONR considered when the strategy review was embarked upon and it was agreed that the encapsulation plant should be in abeyance. He added that the storage of ungrouted waste in the store was one of the last pieces of the jigsaw with a safety case due to be submitted to ONR. He concluded that the main issue was

whether it was possible to dispose of a package that had been through that process rather than encapsulate it.

Mrs Robertson highlighted that rather than waiting until the encapsulation plant was fully operational, the Site could sequentially recover the waste from the bunkers and store it ungrouted whilst constructing the solid ILW encapsulation plant (SILWE). However, bunker one's waste could be taken to SILWE as the first waste to be encapsulated.

Mrs Holmes enquired whether the bunkers vented to the atmosphere and if so, what were they venting. Mr Reuben Phillips clarified that nothing was vented into the atmosphere due to the waste being undisturbed and stable. He added that the plant ventilated the loading room and offered a cascade to protect personnel in the room above rather than conditioning the vaults. Mr Phillips confirmed that there were vents on all buildings to prevent effect to the buildings and working environment which generated very little activity. Mr Stubbs offered further clarification on the advantages of this process commenting that they did not wish to leave the waste in bunkers indefinitely as UK strategy was to put material in the stores in a suitable condition, so when UK disposal facility was available, it could be readily transferred for permanent disposal.

Mrs Holmes highlighted that Mrs Robertson's presentation omitted to provide information on emissions into the air from the ungrouted material. Mrs Robertson explained that no content had been included as it was not deemed to be an issue. Mr Phillips confirmed this to be the case with no discharges from the ILW Store. Mr Phillips added that the material would not degrade during its time in the Store.

Following further questioning from Mrs Holmes, SEPA and ONR could not offer any further information on emissions from ILW. In light of this, Mrs Holmes questioned how SEPA and ONR could therefore give permission for material to be placed ungrouted if they did not have suitable information on emissions. Mrs Holmes stated that it seemed as though the industry was making the decisions on this practice. Both ONR and SEPA confirmed that this was not the case. Mr Hammond stated that gaseous discharge limits would have to be adhered to and that monitoring was in place. At this point, Mr Phillips clarified that monitoring was internal to the building with air samples and gaseous monitoring undertaken to protect staff. Any emissions from the ILW Store would be expected to be negligible and monitored.

Finally, Mr Bale wished to note his disappointment that no communication or apology had been received from the NDA regarding their non-attendance.

8. PUBLIC Q & A SESSION

There were no further questions received from the public gallery.

9. ANY OTHER BUSINESS

Mr John Lamb raised a question regarding a Scottish Power planning application to build a new sub-station which would have an effect on traffic on the access road. He asked whether this had been taken into consideration with regards to safety measures. Mr Stubbs confirmed that the Hunterston A was working with Scottish Power and relevant networks to ensure this was properly managed.

Subsequently, Mr Ghannad added that as part of the emergency response, there was a desire for the access road to be kept clear for emergency vehicles to gain site access. He confirmed that assurances had been given that the road would be clear with provisions made for off-road parking facilities for lorries. It was confirmed that improvements would be made to the access



road as and when required. Mr Lamb indicated that as the application had gone to planning, any comments should be directed to this department. It was noted that North Ayrshire Council had a duty to prepare an off-site emergency plan and take into account the increased number of people in this instance.

Mr Bale advised the SSG of an email received via the Secretariat from a resident of Arran regarding emergency arrangements. Mr Bale indicated that his understanding was that Arran was outwith the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ). Mr Stubbs confirmed that Arran was not within the DEPZ and that the emergency arrangements were designed to be flexible and extendable, just in case of the very remote possibility they were ever required. Mr Bale proposed further discussions with Mr Stubbs outwith the SSG with Mr Stubbs offering to give a formal response to the email. **(Action 03)**

10. DATE & VENUE OF NEXT MEETING

The date and venue of the next meeting was confirmed as Thursday 14 March 2013 within the Seamill Hydro Hotel, Seamill.

Mr Tony Bale
SSG Chairman

ACTION LIST

30th Site Stakeholder Group Meeting

Thursday, 6 December 2012

No	Action	Responsible	Target Date	Status/Comments
01	A presentation to be given on "Enhanced Emergency Plans" at the next SSG Meeting.	Mr Morrison	14/03/13	Closed on 14/3/2013
02	To provide a copy of the SEPA CP7 investigation report.	Mr Stackhouse	14/03/13	Closed on 14/3/2013
03	To respond to an email from a resident from Arran regarding emergency arrangements.	Mr Stubbs	14/03/13	Closed on 14/3/2013

Action Points (carried forward from 06/09/12)

No	Action	Responsible	Target Date	Status/Comments
01	Hunterston B station to measure the discharge rates from now until the next SSG Meeting and present the results in diagrammatic form over a 24 hour, weekly and monthly period.	Mr Morrison	06/12/12	Ongoing

Action Points (carried forward from 07/06/12)

No	Action	Responsible	Target Date	Status/Comments
03	To contact the Environment Agency to confirm their satisfaction with the regulator at Drigg and that unsatisfactory conditions had been rectified.	Mr Stackhouse	06/09/12	Closed on 14/3/2013